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Reexamining Decision-Making Processes
in International Environmental Law
David A. Wirth*
INTRODUCTION
International environmental law, like international law generally, is
first and foremost a set of rules or norms governing relations among states.
But many threats addressed by multilateral environmental diplomacy-the
"greenhouse" effect, stratospheric ozone depletion, acid rain, international
trade in hazardous substances, and loss of biological diversity and tropical
forests-strain traditional models of international interactions.' Not coin-
cidentally, as public concern about these hazards has heightened, interna-
tional law has received closer scrutiny and occasionally been criticized as
ineffective in providing meaningful responses to potentially serious global
environmental perils.2 Simultaneously, with the end of the Cold War, some
have called for democratization of foreign policy processes generally, even
in areas typically considered core national security concerns.3 Such trends
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Grunewald, Louise A. Halper, Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr., Alan S. Miller, Brian C. Murchison,
Peter H. Sand, Bernhard Schloh, Kathryn Sessions, Mary A. Stilts, and Kevin C. Wells. This
Article is based on presentations delivered by the author at a conference entitled "Earth Rights
and Responsibilities: Human Rights and Environmental Protection" at Yale Law School, New
Haven, Connecticut, on April 4, 1992 and at the American Bar Association's Twentieth
Annual Conference on the Environment entitled "The Role of Law in the United Nations'
1992 Conference on Environment and Development" at Airlie House, Warrenton, Virginia on
May 18, 1991.
1. See David D. Newsom, The New Diplomatic Agenda: Are Governments Ready?, 65
Int'l Aff. 29 (1989) (noting challenges to accepted notions of sovereignty, changing relation-
ships between public and private actors in international relations, technical complexity of
environmental issues, and institutional challenges).
2. See Developments in the Law-International Environmental Law, 104 Harv. L. Rev.
1484 (1991). This extended essay decries the alleged ineffectiveness of the customary law of
state responsibility as a tool for improving environmental quality, id. at 1492-1504 (criticizing
"stillborn regime of international liability"), the supposedly inconsequential role of state-to-
state third party dispute resolution processes, id. at 1561-63 (describing "failure of interna-
tional adjudication"), and the asserted vagueness to the point of unenforceability of many
existing substantive requirements, id. at 1504-06. See also David A. Wirth, Book Review, 2 Y.B.
Int'l Envtl. L. 479 (1991) (reviewing International Law and Pollution (Daniel B. Magraw, ed.,
1991)).
3. E.g., Mark Danner, How the Foreign Policy Machine Broke Down, N.Y. Times, Mar.
7, 1993, § 6 (Magazine), at 32. Danner argues, 'The United States, because it became a
superpower during the early nuclear era, created for itself a foreign-policy-making machinery
that in the end had little to do with the principles underlying the country's institutions and
political beliefs." Id. at 34. He then identifies "making a democratic foreign policy" as a critical
imperative. Id.
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have stimulated a change in thinking about the role of nonstate actors in the
international system, and international environmental law is at the fore-
front of these developments.4
Heightened attention to a new generation of international issues such
as environment, concerned less with national security and more with
individual welfare, has given rise to increasing demands from the public for
a voice in international organizations and processes.5 International envi-
ronmental law often has direct analogues in municipal laws and regulations
intended to protect public health and to preserve natural resources, which
until recently were considered matters of primarily national concern.
Consequently, in recent years the distinction between domestic and inter-
national environmental policies has blurred. This "internationalization" of
environmental law also has raised expectations of congruence between the
international system and national decision-making procedures, under
which a high level of public input is often the rule for addressing
environmental issues currently discussed in multilateral fora.6
To be sure, by comparison with states as represented by their
governments, individuals and other nonstate actors still play a small role in
making, assuring observance of, and settling disputes concerning interna-
tional environmental law. On the international level, however, as well as the
domestic, public participation in defining, implementing, and applying
international environmental law can facilitate the twin goals of accountabil-
ity and efficacy. 7 Accordingly, this Article addresses four topics that have
4. See, e.g., David S. Rubinton, Toward a Recognition of the Rights of Non-States in
International Environmental Law, 9 Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 475 (1992); Philippe J. Sands, The
Environment, Community, and International Law, 30 Harv. Int'l L.J. 393, 394 (1989); A. Dan
Tarlock, The Role of Non-Governmental Organizations in the Development of International
Environmental Law, 68 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 61 (1992).
5. See Maurice F. Strong, ECO '92: Critical Challenges and Global Solutions, 44 J. Int'l
Aff. 287, 298-99 (1991) (description by Secretary General of United Nations Conference on
Environment and Development of rise in demand for public voice).
6. See, e.g., John H. Adams, Responsible Militancy -The Anatomy of a Public Interest
Law Firm, 29 Rec. Ass'n B. City N.Y. 631, 632 (1974); Lynton K. Caldwell et al., Citizens and
the Environment: Case Studies in Popular Action (1976); U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency, Unfinished Business: A Comparative Assessment of Environmental Problems 95-97
(1987) (identifying differences between prioritization of environmental risks by scientists and
public, and emphasizing public's role in establishing environmental priorities).
7. This Article considers opportunities to expand and regularize institutional roles for
nongovernmental entities by analogy to both domestic and international models that the
international community can implement without disrupting the fundamental fabric of
international law. The analysis is neither a strict proof of the need for those vehicles nor
evidence of the legitimacy of the constraints imposed by existing international law. By contrast,
other commentators assert the need for supranational authorities that would exercise some of
the sovereign authority now held by national governments. SeeJessica T. Mathews, Redefining
Security, Foreign Aff., Spring 1989, at 162, 174 ( "mhe need for... new institutions and
regulatory regimes to cope with the world's growing environmental interdependence is...
compelling.... Put bluntly, our accepted definition of the limits of national sovereignty as
coinciding with national borders is obsolete."); Sands, supra note 4, at 393 ( "mhe notion of
sovereignty which underlies the current [international legal] regime poses insurmountable
obstacles when the problems to be addressed are transnational in scope."); cf. infra text
accompanying note 98 (describing Declaration of the Hague). But see Marc A. Levy et al.,
Institutions for Promoting International Environmental Protection, Env't, May 1992, at 12, 36
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attracted little explicit attention in the international legal field, but that may
have considerable potential for overcoming impediments in international
environmental law. First, after examining the role of the public in the
creation of international law, this Article assesses the potential for expand-
ing and regularizing access to multilateral negotiations and other interna-
tional fora by nongovernmental observers. Next, this Article evaluates the
public's role in the implementation of international law and suggests
employing a "private attorney general" theory of international oversight
that nonstate actors can initiate. The Article then analyzes the role of the
public in formal international dispute settlement processes and considers
the creation of greater opportunities for members of the public to express
views as amici to international tribunals. Finally, the Article scrutinizes the
utility of nonconsensus decision-making models on the international level
and makes recommendations for situations in which procedures that could
bind states without their consent might be appropriate.
I. THE LAw-MAKING FUNCTION AND THE PUBLIC
International legal standards in the environmental field lack the
sophistication that characterizes some areas of international law. For
instance, basic principles concerning freedom of the high seas have evolved
over several centuries and were codified more than three decades ago.8 By
contrast, the creation of environmental norms still absorbs the international
community. Indeed, the first binding, substantive, and potentially global
multilateral agreements on such pressing environmental problems as
exportation of hazardous wastes9 and depletion of the stratospheric ozone
layer' 0 have been agreed upon only in the last ten years. Negotiations on
(arguing that the world community can mitigate international environmental problems
without departing from fundamental prindples of international law pertaining to state
sovereignty). Unless the context requires otherwise, in this Article terms such as "nonstate
actor," "the public," "private entity," and "private party" refer without distinction to any
nongovernmental entity, including but not limited to individuals, nonprofit environmental
organizations, and privately owned business corporations.
8. Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450
U.N.T.S. 82. See generally Office for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, United Nations,
The Law of the Sea-Navigation on the High Seas: Legislative History of Part VII, § I (arts.
87, 89, 90-94, 96-98) of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea at 8-38 (1989);
Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, pt. V introductory
note (1987) [hereinafter Restatement]; Hugo Grotius, The Freedom of the Seas (James B.
Scott ed. & Ralph van Deman Margoffin trans., 1916) (1633).
9. Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes
and Their Disposal, Mar. 22, 1989, S. Treaty Doc. No. 5, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991), 28
I.L.M. 657 [hereinafter Basel Convention], reprinted in 2 Selected Multilateral Treaties in the
Field of the Environment 449 (Iwona Rummel-Bulska & Seth Osafo eds., 1991) [hereinafter
Rummel-Bulska & Osafo], and in 19 Envtl. Pol'y & L. 68 (1989), and in Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA)
21:3101.
10. Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, S.
Treaty Doc. No. 10, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987), 26 I.L.M. 1550, reprinted in 52 Fed. Reg.
47,515 (Dec. 14, 1987), and in Rummel-Bulska & Osafo, supra note 9, at 309, and in 17 Envtl.
Po'y & L. 256 (1987), amended and adjusted S. Treaty Doc. No. 4, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991),
30 I.L.M. 539, reprinted in Rummel-Bulska & Osafo, supra note 9, at 315, 316, and in 1 Y.B.
Int'l Envtl. L. 612 (1990), and in Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 21:3151, amended and adjusted, Nov. 25,
1992, S. Treaty Doc. No. 9, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993), 32 I.L.M. 875 [hereinafter Montreal
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the creation of the first international legal norms designed to safeguard the
integrity of the Earth's climate'1 and the first comprehensive attempt to
provide in situ protection for the planet's biological diversity12 have just
recently concluded. These two new multilateral conventions were opened
for signature at the United Nations Conference on Environment and
Development (UNCED)-the "Earth Summit"-held in Rio de Janeiro in
June 1992 and attended by more than 100 heads of state.
Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Develop-
ment, one of the principal instruments adopted at the Earth Summit, states:
Environmental issues are best handled with the participation of
all concerned citizens, at the relevant level. At the national level,
each individual shall have appropriate access to information
concerning the environment that is held by public authorities,
including information on hazardous materials and activities in
their communities [sic], and the opportunity to participate in
decision-making processes. States shall facilitate and encourage
public awareness and participation by making information widely
available. Effective access to judicial and administrative proceed-
ings, including redress and remedy, shall be provided.' 3
Thanks to UNCED's universal scope, this statement clearly endorses the
relationship between public participation and democratic decision-making
processes on the one hand and environmental quality on the other. This
nexus previously had been acknowledged on the international level in
piecemeal fashion at best.14
Protocol]; see infra text accompanying note 99 (describing adjustment process). See generally
Richard E. Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy: New Directions in Safeguarding the Planet (1991).
11. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, S. Treaty
Doc. No. 38, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992), 31 I.L.M. 851 [hereinafter Climate Convention],
reprinted in The Earth Summit: The United Nations Conference on Environment and
Development (UNCED) 59 (Stanley P. Johnson ed., 1993) [hereinafter Johnson], and in 3
Agenda 21 & the UNCED Proceedings 1686 (Nicholas A. Robinson ed., 1992) [hereinafter
Robinson], and in 22 Envtl. Pol'y & L. 258 (1992), and in I Rev. Eur. Community & Int'l Envtl.
L. 350 (1992), and in Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 21:3901. See generally Daniel Bodansky, The
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change: A Commentary, 18 Yale J. Int'l
L. 451 (1993); David A. Wirth & Daniel A. Lashof, Beyond Vienna and Montreal: A Global
Framework Convention on Greenhouse Gases, 2 Transnat'l L. & Contemp. Probs. 79 (1992).
12. Convention on Biological Diversity, May 22, 1992, S. Treaty Doc. No. 20, 103d Cong.,
Ist Sess, (1993), 31 I.L.M. 822, reprinted in Johnson, supra note 11, at 82, and in 3 Robinson,
supra note 11, at 1657, and in 22 Envtl. Pol'y & L. 251 (1992), and in 1 Rev. Eur. Community
& Int'l Envd. L. 359 (1992), and in Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 21:4001.
13. Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, June 14, 1992, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.151/5/Rev. 1 (1992), 31 I.L.M. 876 [hereinafter Rio Declaration], reprinted in
Johnson, supra note 11, at 118, and in 3 Robinson, supra note 11, at 1617, and in 22 Envtl.
Po'y & L. 268 (1992), and in 1 Rev. Eur. Community & Int'l Envtl. L. 348 (1992). The Rio
Declaration is a nonbinding, hortatory, "soft" instrument. See Pierre M. Dupuy, Soft Law and
the International Law of the Environment, 12 Mich. J. Int'l L. 420 (1991); Pierre M. Dupuy,
Remarks, 82 Proc. Am. Soc'y Int'l L. 381 (1988).
14. A number of legislative instruments have created rights of access to governmentally
held documents - related to, but nonetheless distinct from, standards for participation in law-
making functions. E.g., Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1988); Emergency
Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001-11050 (1988);
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An explicit call for direct public participation in international pro-
cesses is notably absent from this exhortation. 5 That is not surprising.
Private entities in international law traditionally had no procedural rights
whatsoever, whether in informal bilateral discussions between two govern-
ments or in more formal multilateral undertakings at intergovernmental
organizations like the United Nations. 16 That situation is slowly changing.
Directive on the Freedom of Access to Information on the Environment, 1990 O.J. (L 158) 56,
reprinted in Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 131:7001 (establishing guidelines for access to publicly held
information relating to environment). Alternatively, international instruments specify rights
to information in certain contexts. The widely accepted methodology of environmental impact
assessment-the international analogue to the provisions of the National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (1988)-includes access to information
and public participation as desirable or necessary components of a larger framework designed
to assure the soundness of decision-making processes that may have adverse environmental
impacts. See Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context,
Feb. 25, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 802 [hereinafter Espoo Convention], reprinted in Int'l Env't Rep.
(BNA) 21:4101 (not in force) (adopted under auspices of UN Economic Commission for
Europe, whose members include all European states, the United States, and Canada); Rio
Declaration, supra note 13, Principle 17 ( "Environmental impact assessment, as a national
instrument, shall be undertaken for proposed activities that are likely to have a significant
adverse impact on the environment and are subject to a decision of a competent national
authority.") See generally Environmental Impact Assessment: Theory and Practice (Peter
Wathern ed., 1989); David A. Wirth, International Technology Transfer and Environmental
Impact Assessment, in Transferring Hazardous Technologies and Substances: The Interna-
tional Legal Challenge 83 (Gunther Handl & Robert Lutz eds., 1989). International risk
communication standards likewise require both public access to information and public
participation. See Decision-Recommendation Concerning Provision of Information to the
Public and Public Participation in Decision-Making Processes Related to the Prevention of, and
Response to, Accidents Involving Hazardous Substances, O.E.C.D. Doc. C(88)85, reprinted in
28 I.L.M. 278. See generally Henri Smets, The Right to Information on the Risks Created by
Hazardous Installations at the National and International Levels, in International Responsi-
bility for Environmental Harm 449 (Francesco Francioni & Tullio Scovazzi eds., 1991)
(emphasizing instruments of Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development).
15. See Letter from Peter H. Sand, Principal Program Officer, United Nations Conference
on Environment and Development, to David A. Wirth (Sept. 29, 1992) (on file with the Iowa
Law Review) (noting that although the words "at the relevant level" in Principle 10 and the Rio
Declaration generally do not provide for public participation in decision-making on the
international level, Agenda 21, another UNCED instrument, anticipates entry points into
multilateral processes for members of the public). But see Jeffrey D. Kovar, A Short Guide to
the Rio Declaration, 4 Colo. J. Int'l Envtl. L. & Pol'y 119, 131 (1993) (asserting that Principle
10 "calls for broad participation by the public at national and international levels").
16. International law has long been defined strictly as the set of legal norms governing the
relations among states, the sole "subjects" of international law, ordinarily as represented by
their governments. See, e.g., Sands, supra note 4, at 396-401. Some areas of international law,
most notably the field of human rights, acknowledge a role for individuals to the extent that
international law prescribes standards for the treatment of individuals by states and provides
individuals certain rights and remedies. E.g., U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 3, art. 13, para. 1(b),
art. 55, para. c, art. 62, para. 2; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19,
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 6 I.L.M. 368; International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, 6 I.L.M. 360; Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, G.A. Res. 217, U.N. GAOR, 3d. Sess., 183d plen. mtg at 71, U.N. Doc A/810 (1948).
A number of regional agreements and nonbinding declarations recognize a right to a
minimally decent environment. See Banjul Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, June 27,
1981, art. 24, 21 I.L.M. 58, 63; Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human
Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Protocol of San Salvador), Nov.
14, 1988, art. 11, 28 I.L.M. 161, 165; Declaration of the Hague on the Environment, Mar. 11,
1989, para. 5, 28 I.L.M. 1308, 1309 reprinted in 5 Am. U.J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 567 (1990), and in
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Private parties, including scientists, businesspeople, and representatives of
public interest organizations, have begun to participate as observers in
international negotiations, especially those on environmental issues. As a
result, practice with respect to nongovernmental observers now varies
widely among international organizations, which appear to have signifi-
cantly differing theories of public participation.1 7
Public participation in law-making functions, particularly those that
unelected officials carry out in settings such as administrative rulemakings
in the United States, has been justified on theories of facilitating account-
ability to the public,' 8 informed decisionmaking by public authorities,19 and
19 Envtl. Pol'y & L. 78 (1989), and in 30 Harv. Int'l L.J. 417-20 (1989), and in [12 Current Rep.]
Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 215 (1989); see also Declaration of the United Nations Conference on
the Human Environment (Stockholm Declaration), Principle 1, G.A. Conference on the
Human Environment, 27th Sess., Annex 2, at 4, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14 & Corr. 1 (1972),
11 I.L.M. 1416, 1417 ("Man has the fundamental right to freedom, equality and adequate
conditions of life, in an environment of a quality that permits a life of dignity and well-being
... "); cf. Rio Declaration, supra note 13, Principle 1 ("Human beings are at the centre of
concerns for sustainable development.... They are entitled to a healthy and productive life
in harmony with nature."). The constitutions of a number of states recognize an individual
right to environment. See Edith B. Weiss, In Fairness to Future Generations, app. B, at 297
(1989) (collecting provisions); Ernst Brandl & Hartwin Bungert, Constitutional Entrenchment
of Environmental Protection: A Comparative Analysis of Experiences Abroad, 16 Harv. Envtl.
L. Rev. 1 (1992); Dinah Shelton, Human Rights, Environmental Rights, and the Right to
Environment, 28 Stan. J. Int'l L. 103, 104 n.5 (1991). However, the international community
has not universally recognized a fundamental human right to an acceptable environment. See
Experts Group on Envtl. Law of the World Comm'n on Env't and Dev., Environmental
Protection and Sustainable Development: Legal Principles and Recommendations 42 (1987)
(stating that a fundamental human right to environment "remains an ideal which must still be
realized"); Shelton, supra, at 133. But cf. W. Paul Gormley, The Legal Obligation of the
International Community to Guarantee a Pure and Decent Environment: The Expansion of
Human Rights Norms, 4 Geo. Int'l Envtl. L. Rev. 85, 85 (1990) ("The right of private
individuals to be guaranteed a decent and safe environment is one of the newer rubrics of
human rights law that has been recognized since the 1970s."); Iveta Hodkova, Is There A
Right to a Healthy Environment in the International Legal Order?, 7 Conn. J. Int'l L. 65,
79-80 (1991) ("At present the necessity of the right itself is not disputed; rather, the differences
of opinion concern the problem of how to classify and enforce the right."); Henn-Juri
Uibopuu, The Internationally Guaranteed Right of an Individual to a Clean Environment, in
Human Rights in the World Community: Issues and Action 151, 153 (Richard P. Claude &
Burns H. Weston eds., 1989) (arguing that "human rights contain a specific right of an
individual to a clean environment"). See infra text accompanying note 127 (discussing
difficulties with justiciability of right to environment).
17. David A. Wirth, A Matchmaker's Challenge: Marrying International Law and Amer-
ican Environmental Law, 32 Va.J. Int'l L. 377, 381-83 (1992). See generallyJJ. Lador-Led'rer,
International Non-Governmental Organizations and Economic Entities: A Study in Autono-
mous Organization and Ius Gentium (1963); R. G. Sybesma-Knol, The Status of Observers in
the United Nations 295-318 (1981).
18. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Cosde, 657 F.2d 298, 400-01 (D.C. Cir. 1981) ("Under our
system of government, the very legitimacy of general policymaking performed by unelected
administrators depends in no small part upon the openness, accessibility, and amenability of
these officials to the needs and ideas of the public from whom their ultimate authority derives,
and upon whom their commands must fall."); Arthur E. Bonfield, The Federal APA and State
Administrative Law, 72 Va. L. Rev. 297, 316-18 (1986) ( "(Ain administrative agency is not
ordinarily a representative body, its deliberations are not usually conducted in public, and its
members are not subject to direct political controls in the same way as legislators.... Broad
citizen participation in the rulemaking process is therefore an excellent check on agencies that
are unresponsive to public needs."); Daniel J. Fiorino, Environmental Risk and Democratic
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governmental efficiency.20 The National Environmental Policy Act,21 the
nation's "environmental constitution,"22 for similar reasons explicitly pro-
vides for public participation in preparing environmental documentation
required by that legislation.23 Numerous environmental statutes require
public notice of proposed regulations, an opportunity for public comment
Process: A Critical Review, 14 Colum.J. Envtl. L. 501,546 (1989) (arguing that administrative
process "should reflect democratic values and the intellectual contributions of democratic
theory," notwithstanding public's lack of technical expertise); Wesley A. Magat & Christopher
H. Schroeder, Administrative Process Reform in a Discretionary Age: The Role of Social
Consequences, 1984 Duke L.J. 301, 316-19; Robert B. Reich, Public Administration and
Public Deliberation: An Interpretive Essay, 94 Yale L.J. 1617 (1985). Reich states:
The job of the public administrator is not merely to make decisions on the public's
behalf, but to help the public deliberate over the decisions that need to be made.
Rather than view debate and controversy as managerial failures that make policy-
making and implementation more difficult, the public administrator should see them
as natural and desirable aspects of the formation of public values, contributing to
society's self-understanding.
Id. at 1637. See also Ann Bray, Comment, Scientific Decision Making: A Barrier to Citizen
Participation in Environmental Agency Decision Making, 17 Win. Mitchell L. Rev. 1111 (1991)
(analyzing responses to survey of agency staff and members of public).
19. See, e.g., National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 482 F.2d 672,
683 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (public participation "opens up the process of agency policy innovation
to a broad range of criticism, advice, and data"); Bonfield, supra note 18. Bonfield states:
An agency's accumulated knowledge and expertise are rarely sufficient to provide all
the needed data for rulemaking decisions. Persons who are affected by agency actions
are often in the best position to provide much of the specific information necessary
for wise rule formulation. An opportunity for interested persons to inform appro-
priate administrators of facts, views, or arguments that they consider relevant to a
proposed rule is, therefore, necessary for the sound operation of government.
Id. at 316-17. See also James T. Harrington & Barbara A. Frick, Opportunities for Public
Participation in Administrative Rulemaking, 15 Nat. Resources Law. 537, 537-38 (1983)
("Administrative agencies actively solicit detailed, technical information from the regulated
community in recognition that it is impossible to draft appropriate regulations in a factual
vacuum.... [I]t is not only a person's right, but his duty to provide agencies with... hard
technical data and scientific information on the proposal and its economic effect."); Magat &
Schroeder, supra note 18, at 316-19 ("Fairness and accuracy are interrelated, because
techniques for ensuring fairness - adequate notice and the opportunity to participate
meaningfully in proceedings affecting one's interests - will also ensure accuracy."); Paul R.
Verkuil, The Emerging Concept of Administrative Procedure, 78 Colum. L. Rev. 258, 280
(1978).
20. See Magat & Schroeder, supra note 18, at 316-19 (defining efficiency as "the low-cost
resolution of the business" before the decision-maker). But cf. Richard B. Stewart, The
Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 1669, 1709 (1975) (identify-
ing participation by a broader array of societal interests in administrative proceedings as a
trend involving tradeoffs between accountability on the one hand and accuracy and efficiency
on the other).
21. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (1988); see also 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500-1517 (1992) (implementing
regulations).
22. City of Roswell v. New Mexico Water Quality Control Comm'n, (1973] 3 Envtl. L. Rep.
(Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,181, 20,183 (N.M. Ct. App. Nov. 22, 1972).
23. See Forty Most Asked Questions Concerning CEQ's National Environmental Policy Act
Regulations, 46 Fed. Reg. 18,026, 18,028 (1981) ("The public and other agencies reviewing a
Draft EIS [Environmental Impact Statement] can assist the lead agency to develop and
determine environmentally preferable alternatives by providing their views in comments on
the Draft EIS."). See generally Wirth, supra note 17, at 398 & n.78.
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on those proposals, and agency response to public comments. 24 Congress
included notice-and-comment rulemaking requirements in the Administra-
tive Procedure Act, 25 generally applicable to a wide variety of domestic
United States administrative processes, to assure the responsiveness and
efficacy of bureaucratic initiatives.26 Although the details of the mecha-
nisms obviously differ somewhat, other municipal legal systems reflect
similar underlying policies.27
At a high level of generality the analogy between international
procedures, in which diplomats and other technical experts ordinarily
represent governments, and domestic administrative law is a good one, at
least in the field of environment. There is no principled reason why the
standards set out in Principle 10 should not apply at the international, as
well as the domestic, level.28 Indeed, governments may not adequately
24. E.g., Toxic Substances Control Act §§ 4(b), 5(b) & 6(c), 15 U.S.C. §§ 2603(b), 2604(b)
& 2605(c) (1988); Marine Mammal Protection Act §§ 109(d), 111(b) & 115(a), 16 U.S.c.
§§ 1379(d), 1381(b) & 1383b(a) (1988); Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972 § 317, 16
U.S.C. § 1463 (1988); Endangered Species Act of 1973 § 4(b), 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b) (1988);
National Forest Management Act § 6(d), 16 U.S.C. § 1604(d) (1988); Deepwater Port Act of
1974, § 5(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1504(a) (1988); Safe Drinking Water Act §§ 1412(d) & 1421(a), 42
U.S.C. §§ 300g-l(d) & 300h(a) (1988); National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 § 102(C),
42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (1988); Noise Control Act of 1972 § 6(c), 42 U.S.C. § 4905(c) (1988);
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 § 7004(b), 42 U.S.C. § 6974(b) (1988);
Clean Air Act § 307(d), 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d) (1988); Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 §§ 105(c) & 113(k), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9605(c) &
9613(k) (1988); Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, §§ 135(g) & 213(a), 42 U.S.C. §§ 10155(g)
& 10193(a) (1988); Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 § 310, 43 U.S.C.
§ 1740 (1988). Many of these provisions incorporate by reference section 4 of the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1988). See infra note 25.
25. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59, 701-06, 1305, 3105, 3344, 5372, 7521 (1988) [hereinafter APA].
26. A leading treatise describes administrative rulemaking as "'one of the greatest
inventions of modem government.' . . . During coming decades, the prospect is that
governments all over the world will adopt American ideas about rulemaking as a mainstay of
governmental machinery." Kenneth C. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 6:1, at 448-49
(2d ed. 1978); see Final Report of the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative
Procedure, S. Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 102 (1941) (asserting that rulemaking "should
be adapted to giving adequate opportunity to all persons affected to present their views, the
facts within their knowledge, and the dangers and benefits of alternative courses" and help
decision-makers obtain "the information, facts, and probabilities which are necessary to fair
and intelligent action."); see also H.R. Rep. No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946), reprinted in
1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1195, 1205 (The APA's "public information section is basic, because it
requires agencies to take the initiative in informing the public.").
27. See generally Participation and Litigation Rights of Environmental Associations in
Europe (Martin Fuhr & Gerhard Roller eds., 1991) [hereinafter Participation and Litigation
Rights]. See also sources cited supra note 14 (discussing international instruments specifying
rights of participation on national level in context of environmental impact assessment and
risk communication).
28. Participation in international processes through national governments is not neces-
sarily an adequate substitute for direct access to an international forum. For example, the
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund have arranged for accreditation of
representatives of public interest organizations to annual meetings of their Boards of
Governors through national delegations. A number of governments, however, have refused to
approve the participation of their own nationals. See Environmental Impact of World Bank
Lending: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Human Rights and International Organizations
and Subcomm. on International Economic Policy and Trade of the House Comm. on Foreign
Affairs, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 22, 41-42 (1989) (statement of David A. Wirth). But cf Ibrahim
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represent certain issues, positions, interests, or concerns in multilateral
fora.2 9 To the extent that municipal political and legal structures are more
responsive than the international legal order to public concerns, the
discontinuities between the two may delay or impede associated domestic
requirements like ratification of international agreements.3 0 This phenom-
enon, in turn, may undermine the efficacy of international cooperation.31
As noted in the domestic context, "[t]he goal of public participation.
is not to transfer the actual decision-making power over the formulation
and adoption of rules to the interested public, but only to assure an
adequate opportunity for interested persons to communicate their views
and information to the appropriate ... officials."'32 As on the domestic level,
input from members of the public should not disrupt the smooth function-
ing of international mechanisms in which the chief participants are
governments. 33 Further, international processes cannot be expected to
incorporate the lawmaking requirements of every participating nation.
Even within these limits, the international community can make
substantial progress in creating mechanisms to assure the integrity and
public accountability of international law. While care is required in making
analogies between municipal legal systems and international law, the
requirements associated with domestic rulemaking in the United States
might be a starting point for creating those mechanisms. Perhaps, however,
an entirely different scheme is necessary to respond to the peculiarities of
the international legal system, as well as to the domestic legal systems of
various states. Despite the potential complexities, it is nonetheless possible
generically to identify a minimum set of requirements, using Principle 10 of
the Rio Declaration as a guidepost.
F.I. Shihata, The World Bank and Non-Governmental Organizations, 25 Cornell Int'l LJ.
623, 641 (1992) (statement by World Bank Vice President and General Counsel describing
Bank's intention to "pay[] particular attention to the practice of involving the beneficiaries and
potentially adversely affected populations at the earliest possible stage in the design of
Bank-financed projects").
29. See infra text accompanying notes 77-83 (discussing "tuna dolphin" dispute in GATI).
30. See infra note 97 and accompanying text (discussing the "lowest common denomina-
tor" and "slowest boat" phenomena).
31. A good example is the Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource
Activities (Wellington Convention) June 2, 1988, 27 I.L.M. 868, reprinted in Rummel-Bulska &
Osafo, supra note 9, at 415, and in 18 Envtl. Pol'y & L. 115 (1988), and in Int'l Env't Rep.
(BNA) 21:3601 (not in force). This agreement will probably never enter into force because of
domestic environmental opposition in a number of important states, including France and
Australia. See Christopher C. Joyner, Remarks, 85 Proc. Am. Soc'y Int'l L. 464 (1991).
32. Bonfield, supra note 18, at 319.
33. The United Nations Charter explicitly provides for participation by private entities as
observers in the work of the Organization. U.N. Charter art. 71 ("The Economic and Social
Council may make suitable arrangements for consultation with nongovernmental organiza-
tions which are concerned with matters within its competence."). The principal vehicle
governing consultative relationships with nongovernmental organizations is E.S.C. Res. 1296,
U.N. ESCOR 45th Sess., Supp. No. 1, at 21, U.N. Doc. E/4548 (1968). Paragraph 13 of that
instrument specifies that consultative arrangements with nongovernmental organizations
"should not be such as to overburden the [Economic and Social] Council or transform it from
d body for co-ordination of policy and action, as contemplated in the [UN] Charter, into a
general forum for discussion." Id.
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First, the public should have access to interim drafts of legal and other
significant instruments, including multilateral treaties, decisions of inter-
national organizations, and nonbinding principles and guidelines.34 Sec-
ond, nongovernmental entities ought to have an opportunity to comment
on those drafts, to have their critiques distributed to governmental nego-
tiators and the secretariats of international organizations, and to have their
suggestions considered in good faith by representatives of states and
international organizations. Finally, multilateral fora should permit those
nonstate actors demonstrating an economic stake or other serious concern
or expertise with respect to a particular subject matter to participate as
observers in at least some negotiating sessions. A threshold requirement of
this sort, analogous to the "standing" inquiry in domestic law,35 would
assure representation of affected interests without distorting the funda-
mental focus on representatives of states.
At least one precedent on the international level goes considerably
further than this proposal. In the International Labor Organization (ILO),
founded just after World War I, workers and employers organizations are
participating, voting delegates to the annual International Labor Confer-
ence. The ILO's "tripartite" structure assures that nongovernmental rep-
resentatives equal governmental delegates in total numbers at the Confer-
ence, which is the ILO's plenary body that adopts binding multilateral
conventions.3 6 In any event, the complexities of the task should not distract
from the need for greater accountability as international law begins to
address more issues that affect people's lives, livelihoods, and the very
habitability of the planet.
II. INTERNATIONAL SUPERVISORY MECHANISMS AND THE PUBLIC
Without adequate implementation, legal rules, international as well as
domestic, are only black marks on a piece of paper. Consequently, many
federal environmental statutes not only authorize governmental authori-
ties, but also empower members of the public, to sue polluters directly for
violations of those laws. These "citizen suits" supplement governmental
34. See supra note 13 (distinguishing binding and nonbinding instruments).
35. See, e.g., E.S.C. Res. 1296, supra note 33, which establishes standards organizations
should satisfy to obtain consultative status with the UN Economic and Social Council(ECOSOC). The organization must "be of representative character and of recognized
international standing," id. at para. 4, "represent a substantial proportion, and express the
views of major sections, of the population or of the organized persons within the particular
field of its competence," id., "have a democratically adopted constitution," id. at para. 5, and
"have the authority to speak for its members through its authorized representatives." Id. at
para. 6.
36. Constitution of the International Labor Organization, Oct. 9, 1946, arts. 3, 4, 62 Stat.
3485 (1948), T.I.A.S. No. 1868, 15 U.N.T.S. 35, amendedJune 25, 1953, 7 U.S.T. 245, T.I.A.S.
No. 3500, 191 U.N.T.S. 143, amended June 22, 1962, 14 U.S.T. 1039, T.I.A.S. No. 5401, 466
U.N.T.S. 323, amended June 22, 1972, 25 U.S.T. 3253, T.I.A.S. No. 7987 [hereinafter ILO
Constitution]. Even in the ILO, however, rights of participation by nongovernmental parties
are collective, not individual. See generally Nicolas Valticos, International Labour Law (1979);
Ernest A. Landy, The Implementation Procedures of the International Labor Organization,
20 Santa Clara L. Rev. 633 (1980).
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enforcement efforts, especially those that are inadequate or deficient.37
Proceeding under a theory of judicial review, private parties may even
compel the government and governmental officials to comply with appli-
cable legal standards.38 In addition to creating a remedy for individual
grievances, this "private attorney general" model of citizen enforcement
furthers the public interest by encouraging strict compliance with applica-
ble standards.39
On the international level there is also great, and perhaps increasing,
concern for full compliance with, and adequate mechanisms to assure
observance of, environmental norms. States undertaking major environ-
mental obligations often want assurances that their treaty partners to
multilateral agreements are in fact implementing the same requirements.
Especially in the environmental field, where fulfilling international obliga-
tions may involve significant economic costs, deviations from international
norms can create competitive advantages for noncomplying states. Accord-
ingly, assuring widespread compliance by removing the benefits to poten-
tial scofflaws and laggards is in the interest of both states and the public
worldwide. Moreover, members of the public are the ultimate intended
beneficiaries of many international obligations, particularly in the areas of
environment and public health and welfare.
A variety of factors can stymie efforts by one state to compel perfor-
mance by another. The availability of compulsory, third-party, state-to-state
dispute resolution alone does not assure full compliance with international
environmental norms. 40 For example, a state whose own performance of
international obligations is inadequate may hesitate to proceed against
others for fear of calling attention to itself or establishing undesirable
precedents. Notwithstanding a meritorious legal claim on an environmental
matter, one state may be reluctant to initiate a third-party dispute settle-
ment process against another state for fear of jeopardizing other strategic
or economic bilateral relationships. To encourage conscientious and wide-
spread observation of international standards, obligations can be structured
in a way that facilitates implementation.41 Less formal, streamlined dispute
37. See generally Michael D. Axline, Environmental Citizen Suits (1991); Jeffrey G. Miller,
Environmental Law Institute, Citizen Suits: Private Enforcement of Federal Pollution Control
Laws (1987); William H. Timbers & David A. Wirth, Private Rights of Action and Judicial
Review in Federal Environmental Law, 70 Cornell L. Rev. 403, 405 n.8 (1985).
38. Actions initiated by a private party pursuant to a citizen suit provision to compel
federal officials to perform nondiscretionary acts or duties are analytically distinct from citizen
suits. Timbers & Wirth, supra note 37, at 405 n.8. Under the Administrative Procedure Act,
a reviewing court "shall compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed."
5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (1988). For citations to the federal environmental laws providing forjudicial
review, see Timbers & Wirth, supra note 37, at 407 n.13.
39. See generally Timbers & Wirth, supra note 37.
40. See generally Philippe Sands, Enforcing Environmental Security: The Challenges of
Compliance with International Obligations, 46 J. Int'l Aff. 367 (1993).
41. See, e.g., U.S. General Accounting Office, International Environment: Strengthening
the Implementation of Environmental Agreements 5-7 (1992) (arguing that availability of and
public access to information can enhance support for implementation); Abram Chayes &
Antonia H. Chayes, Adjustment and Compliance Processes in International Regulatory
Regimes, in Preserving the Global Environment 280, 290-304 (Jessica T. Mathews ed., 1991)
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settlement approaches for treating allegations of noncompliance, such as
those included in the 1990 amendments to the Montreal Protocol on
Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer,42 may also overcome some
impediments to compliance.
Because of the numerous disincentives for governments to encourage
other governments to abide by international obligations and because of the
substantial impediments to initiating even informal proceedings, the inter-
national legal system presents, if anything, a greater need for private
attorneys general than does municipal law. There is, however, nothing
analogous to a domestic citizen suit or judicial review action in international
environmental law.
Several nonbinding recommendations on transfrontier pollution 4
adopted under the auspices of the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD) in the late 1970s articulate an equal right of
access for private parties to national remedies for pollution originating in
one state and causing risks or harm in another. The Nordic Environmental
Protection Convention44 establishes similar avenues in a binding treaty
(discussing factors of transparency and accountability); Elizabeth P. Barratt-Brown, Building
a Monitoring and Compliance Regime Under the Montreal Protocol: A Dynamic Agreement
for Protecting the Ozone Layer, 16 Yale J. Int'l L. 519 (1991); Abram Chayes & Antonia H.
Chayes, Compliance Without Enforcement: State Behavior Under Regulatory Treaties, 7
Negotiation J. 311 (1991) (discussing both formal and informal enforcement methods).
42. See Report of the Second Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol on
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, U.N. Doc. EP/OzL.Pro.2/3 UNEP/OzL.Pro.2/3,
Annex III (June 1990) (establishing five-member Implementation Committee to rule on cases
of asserted failure to implement Montreal Protocol), reprinted in 1 Y.B. Int'l Envtl. L. 591
(1990); see also Climate Convention, supra note 11, arts. 10 & 13 (establishing subsidiary body
for implementation of conference of parties).
43. Recommendation of the Council for the Implementation of a Regime of Equal Right
of Access and Non-Discrimination in Relation to Transfrontier Pollution, O.E.C.D. Doc.
C(77)28, reprinted in 16 [.L.M. 977, and in O.E.C.D., OECD and the Environment 150 (1986)
[hereinafter OECD and the Environment], and in 4 Envtl. Pol'y & L. 53 (1978); Recommen-
dation of the Council on Equal Right of Access in Relation to Transfrontier Pollution,
O.E.C.D. Doc. C(76)55, reprinted in 15 I.L.M. 1218, and in OECD and the Environment, supra,
at 148, and in 2 Envtl. Pol'y & L. 104 (1976); Recommendation of the Council on Principles
Concerning Transfrontier Pollution, O.E.C.D. Doc. C(74)224, Tit. D, Annex, reprinted in 14
I.L.M. 242, and in OECD and the Environment, supra, at 142, 145, and in 1 Envtl. Pol'y & L.
44 (1975).
44. Feb. 19, 1974, Den.-Fin.-Nor.-Swed., 13 I.L.M. 591, reprinted in 1 Selected Multilateral
Treaties in the Field of the Environment 403 (Alexandre C. Kiss ed., 1983) [hereinafter Kiss],
and in 1 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 35:1001. Article 3 provides:
Any person who is affected or may be affected by a nuisance caused by environ-
mentally harmful activities in another Contracting State shall have the right to bring
before the appropriate Court or Administrative Authority of that State the question
of the permissibility of such activities, including the question of measures to prevent
damage, and to appeal against the decision of the Court or the Administrative
Authority to the same extent and on the same terms as a legal entity of the State in
which the activities are being carried out.
The provisions of the first paragraph of this Article shall be equally applicable in
the case of proceedings concerning compensation for damage caused by environ-
mentally harmful activities. The question of compensation shall not be judged by
rules which are less favourable to the injured party than the rules of compensation of
the State in which the activities are being carried out.
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context for both abatement of and compensation for harm from trans-
boundary pollution. Still, the availability of remedies at the national level, a
matter of domestic law, circumscribes the efficacy of these remedies.
Particularly as applied to international legal norms, this principle of equal
right of access may be of little utility. In the United States, for example, the
"self-executing" doctrine can substantially constrict access to judicial relief
by private parties in response to a violation of an international agreement.45
Indeed, the United States and Canada agreed to an international arbitra-
tion of the famous Trail Smelter dispute46 precisely because the law of both
countries precluded a domestic judicial remedy for affected private
parties.47
The recentiy adopted trilateral North American Agreement on Envi-
ronmental Cooperation (NAAEC) 4 8-the so-called "side" or "supplemen-
tal" agreement to the North American Free Trade Agreement49-is some-
thing of a hybrid that creates entry points for the public at the international
level primarily to assure the enforcement of domestic environmental laws.
The NAAEC establishes a Commission for Environmental Cooperation
headed by the environment ministers of the three states to the agreement,
serviced by a professional secretariat, and advised by a committee of
individuals appointed in their personal capacities.50 Private organizations
and individuals may complain to the secretariat, alleging that one of the
three parties to the NAAEC has failed effectively to enforce its environ-
mental law.51
There are, however, a number of potentially insurmountable imped-
iments to a resolution of such a submission on the merits. A valid complaint
must meet the subjective requirement of "appear[ing] to be aimed at
Nordic Environmental Protection Convention, supra, art. 3. See generally Charles Phillips,
Nordic Co-operation for the Protection of the Environment Against Air Pollution and the
Possibility of Transboundary Private Litigation, in Transboundary Air Pollution: International
Legal Aspects of the Co-operation of States 153 (Cees Flinterman et al. eds., 1986); Rubinton,
supra note 4, at 489-91.
45. See, e.g., Miller v. United States, 583 F.2d 857, 860-61 (6th Cir. 1978) (suggesting
availability of remedy to Canadian but not United States nationals under Boundary Waters
Treaty, Jan. 11, 1909, U.S.-Gr.Brit., 36 Stat. 2448 (1909)).
46. Trail Smelter Case (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1905 (1938, 1941).
47. See, e.g., Restatement, supra note 8, § 601 reporters' note 1; John E. Read, The Trail
Smelter Dispute, 1 Can. Y.B. Int'l L. 213, 222-23 (1963).
48. North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, Sept. 8,9, 12 & 14, 1993,
U.S.-Can.-Mex., 32 I.L.M. 1482 [hereinafter NAAEC], reprinted in Message from the President
of the United States Transmitting North American Free Trade Agreement Supplemental
Agreements and Additional Documents, H.R. Doc. No. 160, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1993). See
generally Daniel Magraw, NAFTA's Repercussions: Is Green Trade Possible?, Env't, Mar. 1994,
at 14.
49. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 8, 11, 14 & 17, 1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex.,
32 I.L.M. 296, 612, reprinted in Message from the President of the United States Transmitting
North American Free Trade Agreement, Texts of Agreement, Implementing Bill, Statement
of Administrative Action and Required Supporting Statements, H.R. Doc. No. 159, 103d
Cong., 1st Sess. 712 (1993).
50. NAAEC, supra note 48, arts. 8-9, 11, 16.
51. Id. at art. 14.
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promoting enforcement rather than at harassing industry."52 The secretar-
iat will request a response from the government in question only if the
complaint "raises matters whose further study in this process would
advance the goals"53 of the NAAEC, a similarly vague standard. The
secretariat may move forward to the next step, the preparation of a factual
record, only if the three environment ministers, who are governmental
representatives, approve by a two-thirds majority.54 The Commission's
jurisdiction is circumscribed by the exclusion of the very large category of
domestic measures "the primary purpose of which is managing the
commercial harvest or exploitation . . . of natural resources"'55 and "any
statute or regulation... directly related to worker safety or health." 56 Even
then, governments may avoid adverse findings if they can justify nonen-
forcement that meets the highly indeterminate test of "a reasonable
exercise of . . . discretion in respect of investigatory, prosecutorial,
regulatory or compliance matters"57 or that "results from bona fide
decisions to allocate resources to enforcement in respect of environmental
matters determined to have higher priorities."58 In any event, the sole
remedy is a factual record, which does not become public unless two of the
three ministers agree.59
Precedents outside a strictly environmental context-provide examples
of multilaterally established mechanisms through which private parties can
assure that states implement international obligations. The supervisory
machinery of the ILO has a number of mechanisms available to private
parties, as represented by workers and employers organizations, to draw
public attention to nonobservance of binding standards established under
ILO auspices. 60 International human rights law creates remedies for
52. Id. at para. 1(d).
53. Id. at para. 2(b).
54. Id. at art. 15, para. 2.
55. NAAEC, supra note 48, at art. 45, para. 2(b).
56. Id. at para. 2(a).
57. Id. at para. 1(a).
58. Id. at art. 45, para. 1(b).
59. Id. at art. 15, para. 7.
60. One such mechanism, specified in Articles 26 to 29 of the ILO Constitution, supra
note 36, can be initiated by the ILO's Governing Body upon the request of a delegate,
including a worker or employer, to the Conference. The Governing Body can then establish
an independent "Commission of Enquiry" to adjudicate a complaint alleging failure by a state
to fulfill its obligations under an ILO convention. Alternatively, under articles 24 and 25 of the
ILO Constitution, an organization of workers or employers can make a "representation"
alleging a state's nonobservance of an ILO convention to which that state is a party. The
tripartite Governing Body Committee on Freedom of Association is another mechanism for
resolving complaints from governments and workers' and employers' organizations alleging
violations of important ILO human rights conventions guaranteeing the right to organize and
to bargain collectively. Tellingly, because of the importance of these principles of "freedom of
association" to the ILO's constitutional aims and purposes, complaints may be lodged with the
Committee on Freedom of Association whether or not that state has ratified the two freedom
of association conventions. Last, the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions
and Recommendations, whose members are appointed in their individual capacities, receives
regular reports from governments on progress in the implementation of ratified conventions.
The Committee of Experts also receives comments from workers' and employers' organiza-
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private parties against states before bodies such as the UN Human Rights
Committee, the UN Commission on Human Rights, and regional courts
and commissions. Some of these procedures could serve as useful models
for access by nongovernmental parties to international remedies to redress
environmental harm.61
In a major step, the World Bank's Board of Executive Directors
recently created an independent Inspection Panel that provides new
opportunities for private parties to initiate proceedings to encourage
performance of international standards. According to a resolution adopted
in September 1993,62 nongovernmental organizations may seek review of
both failures by the Bank's professional staff to observe that institution's
own internal standards and inadequate supervision by Bank staff of the
implementation of loan covenants by borrowing country governments. The
new Panel consists of three independent experts appointed in their
personal capacities. It is not yet clear whether the Panel will be primarily
investigatory or an adjudicatory body, and in the end it will probably
include some elements of both approaches.
The resolution creating the Panel establishes some potentially signif-
icant limitations to its authority. Only organizations, and not individuals,
may initiate an action before the Inspection Panel. Additionally, the Panel
is confined to considering "failure of the Bank to follow its operational
policies and procedures with respect to the design, appraisal and/or
implementation of a project financed by the Bank. ' 63 These internal Bank
standards, which govern such issues as the prior evaluation of environmen-
tal impacts,6 involuntary resettlement, 65 and indigenous peoples, 66 do not
necessarily reflect customary norms in areas such as human rights. In
tions and produces an annual report containing "observations" in the most important cases of
nonimplementation. See generally E. A. Landy, The Effectiveness of International Supervision
(1966); Landy, supra note 36; Valticos, supra note 36.
61. See David A. Wirth, Legitimacy, Accountability, and Partnership: A Model for
Advocacy on Third World Environmental Issues, 100 Yale LJ. 2645, 2664 n.71 (1991).
62. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development Res. No. 93-10; Interna-
tional Development Association Res. No. 93-6 (Sept. 22, 1993) [hereinafter Inspection Panel
Resolution]. The World Bank's Board of Executive Directors adopted this resolution after
release of a report prepared as a result of an ad hoc independent review of the Bank-funded
Sardar Sarovar Projects. Sardar Sarovar: Report of the Independent Review (1992). In 1985,
the World Bank agreed to lend a total of $450 million to the Government of India for a series
of dams and irrigation projects on the Narmada River. One of them, the Sardar Sarovar Dam,
became the subject of heated environmental and human rights controversy. In an unprece-
dented step, the Bank appointed Bradford Morse, former Administrator of the UN Develop-
ment Agency, to lead a panel of independent experts appointed in their personal capacities in
examining the undertaking. The Independent Review confirmed the anticipated displace-
ment of at least 100,000 people, the lack of an adequate prior environmental analysis by either
the borrower or the Bank, and virtually no attention by the Bank to the Project's potential to
increase the incidence of water-borne disease. This extraordinary independent review in effect
became a conduit for the local public-the intended beneficiary of the project-to have an
indirect input into the Bank's activities. See generally David B. Hunter & Lori Udall, The World
Bank's New Inspection Panel, Env't, Nov. 1994, at 2.
63. Inspection Panel Resolution, supra note 62, at para. 12.
64. World Bank Operational Directive No. 4.01: Environmental Assessment (Oct. 1991).
65. World Bank Operational Directive No. 4.30: Involuntary Resettlement (June 1990).
66. World Bank Operational Directive No. 4.20: Indigenous Peoples (Sept. 1991).
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addition, the Panel, after receiving a request for inspection, may proceed
only with the subsequent approval of the Bank's Board of Executive
Directors. Despite these weaknesses, the new Inspection Panel creates
entirely new formal opportunities for nonstate actors to assure compliance
with international standards, both by the Bank's professional staff and,
indirectly, by borrowing country governments.
Article 169 of the Treaty of Rome 67 establishes a mechanism within
the European Economic Community (EEC) that is perhaps more analogous
to a suit for judicial review under United States law. That provision creates
a cause of action before the European Court of Justice alleging that a
member state has failed to fulfill an obligation under the Treaty or has not
implemented a mandatory Community instrument, such as a directive.68 In
contrast to the institution of judicial review in the United States, a private
party cannot commence an action as of right, but must instead petition the
Commission of the European Communities, which alone has power to
initiate a proceeding against a member state before the Court of Justice.69
As recently amended by the Treaty on European Union,70 the "Maastricht
Treaty," Article 171 of the Treaty of Rome permits the Court of Justice
both to compel member state performance and to assess monetary penalties
67. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, March 25, 1957, 298
U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter Treaty of Rome]. After the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty,
infra note 70, on November 1, 1993, the European Community changed its name to the
European Union (EU). The European Economic Community, created by the Treaty of Rome,
continues to exist as a legal entity within the expanded framework of the European Union.
The Commission of the European Communities continues to use that title in legal and formal
contexts, but otherwise now refers to itself as the European Commission. The Council of
Ministers of the European Communities changed its name to the Council of Ministers of the
European Union.
68. A directive is a binding legislative instrument containing an instruction from the
Community to member states to accomplish goals, often by a certain date, while leaving to
domestic authorities "the choice of form and methods" for implementation at the national
level. Treaty of Rome, supra note 67, at art. 189. The EEC has extensively used directives,
which have something of the character of regulatory legislation that mandates subsequent
implementing legislation in domestic federal law, in the environmental area. E.g., Directive on
the Freedom of Access to Information on the Environment, supra note 14; Directive on the
Assessment of the Effects of Certain Public and Private Projects on the Environment, 1985
O.J. (L 175) 40, reprinted in Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 131:2201. See generally Philippe Sands,
European Community Environmental Law: The Evolution of a Regional Regime of Interna-
tional Environmental Protection, 100 Yale L.J. 2511 (1991).
69. Article 173, paragraph 1 of the Treaty of Rome, supra note 67, creates a cause of
action pursuant to which "[the Court of Justice shall review the lawfulness of acts.., of the
[EU] Council and the Commission," the principal policy-making organs of the Community.
But in contrast to Article 169 proceedings against member states, Article 173, paragraph 2
expressly provides that "[a]ny natural or legal person may... [institute proceedings] against
a decision addressed to [that person] or against a decision which, although in the form of a
regulation or a decision addressed to another person, is of direct and specific concern to [the
former]." Although Article 173 appears to create a mechanism for private parties -to seek
judicial review of the legality of actions taken by the Commission or the Council, restrictive
standing rules and a narrow interpretation of the Treaty of Rome have tended to undermine
the effectiveness of that legal mechanism. Ludwig Kramer, Participation of Environmental
Organisations in the Activities of the EEC, in Participation and Litigation Rights, supra note
27, at 129, 134.
70. Feb. 7, 1992, art. G, para. 51, 31 I.L.M. 253, 292, reprinted in C.M.L.R. 719, 729, and
in 3 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 25,300.
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against member states for violations of Community law. More importantly,
the Article 169 procedure creates informal channels through which the
Commission can encourage implementation of Community law before
reference to the Court of Justice for a formal judgment. 71
Mechanisms initiated by private parties to encourage states' compli-
ance with international environmental norms need not disrupt existing
international law or institutions. Nor must vehicles for measuring states'
performance of legal obligations be wholly, or even primarily, adjudicatory
in nature. Indeed, many existing and effective international remedies rely
.primarily on appeals to public opinion, the so-called "mobilization of
shame. '72 New international bodies, like those in the ILO scheme,73 might
be created to encourage compliance with international environmental
obligations. Alternatively, the jurisdiction and procedure of others, like the
underutilized, but still extant Permanent Court of Arbitration,74 might be
expanded. These modifications might include the establishment of prelim-
inary, streamlined screening functions to assure quick dismissal of frivolous
or unsubstantiated complaints. 75 If nations create effective domestic causes
of action, national courts might also be efficacious fora for enforcing
international legal obligations undertaken by their own governments.75
71. See Peter H. Sand, Lessons Learned in Global Environmental Governance 32-33
(1990) (noting that "[tihe mere opening of EEC action can... have internal political and
economic consequences in member states," and compiling statistics of letters of notice,
reasoned opinions, and references to Court of Justice rendered by Commission in environ-
mental context); Alan Dashwood & Robin White, Enforcement Actions Under Articles 169
and 170 EEC, 14 Eur. L. Rev. 388, 388-89 (1989) (observing that informal communications
between the Commission and the member state normally precede formal action and noting
cases initiated and resolved).
72. E.g., The Effectiveness of International Decisions 434 (Stephen M. Schwebel ed.,
1971).
73. See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
74. See Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, Oct. 18, 1907, 36
Stat. 2199 (1910), T.S. No. 536 [hereinafter 1907 Hague Convention]; Convention for the
Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1779 (1901), T.S. No. 392
[hereinafter 1899 Hague Convention]; see, e.g., Convention on the Conservation of Migratory
Species of Wild Animals, June 23, 1979, art. XIII, para. 2, 19 I.L.M. 15, 26-27 (providing
recourse to Permanent Court of Arbitration by mutual consent of parties to dispute), reprinted
in 5 Envtl. Pol'y & L. 156, 159 (1979); Report of the Conference on Security and Co-operation
in Europe Meeting of Experts on Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, Feb. 8, 1991, Principle 9(f),
30 I.L.M 384, 390 (identifying Permanent Court of Arbitration as option for ad hoc dispute
settlement). See generally M.D. Copithorne, The Permanent Court of Arbitration and the
Election of Members of the International Court of Justice, 16 Can. Y.B. Int'l L. 315 (1978).
75. Cf. 1907 Hague Convention, supra note 74, at arts. 9-36 (establishing international
commissions of inquiry to settle factual disputes); 1899 Hague Convention, supra note 74, at
arts. 9-14 (same).
76. Domestic administrative and judicial proceedings have already been identified as
components of a regime to address transboundary pollution. See supra note 43 (OECD
recommendations on transboundary pollution); cf. Draft Principles of Conduct in the Field of
the Environment for the Guidance of States in the Conservation and Harmonious Utilization
of Natural Resources Shared by Two or More States, principle 14, U.N. Doc. UNEP/IG.12/2
Annex (1978), reprinted in 17 I.L.M. 1097, 1099, approved, U.N. GAOR 33d Sess., Supp. No.
25, at 154, U.N. Doc. A/33/25 (1978), noted, G.A. Res. 34/186, U.N. GAOR 34th Sess., Supp.
No. 46, at 128, U.N. Doc. A/34/46 (1979):
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Although supervisory mechanisms invoked by nonstate actors are
largely unfamiliar in the environmental area, there is reasonable precedent
in other areas of international law. More importantly, the potential benefits
of effective measures to encourage states' observation of international
environmental norms suggest that actions initiated by nongovernmental
entities to encourage compliance deserve focused attention.
III. INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT AND THE PUBLIC
As previously discussed, individuals as well as states have a stake in
states' full performance of international obligations. Adjudications of rights
and obligations among states in formal, third-party dispute resolution
processes, such as contentious cases before the International Court of
Justice (ICJ) or international arbitral tribunals, may also affect both private
interests and matters of public concern.
A recent example demonstrates the need for procedural guarantees of
public access to international dispute settlement proceedings. The "tuna
dolphin" dispute,77 addressed within the framework of the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 78 was an international challenge to a
ban on imports of yellowfin tuna into the United States from Mexico and
other countries. Acting pursuant to a court order obtained by two private
environmental organizations,7 9 the Executive Branch imposed these trade
restrictions under U.S. legislation designed to protect marine mammals
harmed during tuna fishing operations with "purse seine" nets.80
After consultations with the United States failed to provide a satisfac-
tory resolution, Mexico requested the creation of a three-member dispute
States should endeavour.., to provide persons in other States who have been or may
be adversely affected by environmental damage resulting from the utilization of
shared natural resources with equivalent access to and treatment in the same
administrative and judicial proceedings, and make available to them the same
remedies as are available to persons within their own jurisdiction who have been or
may be similarly affected.
77. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, United States - Restrictions on Imports of
Tuna, Basic Instruments and Selected Documents 155 (39th Supp. 1993), reprinted in 30
I.L.M. 1598 [hereinafter United States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna]. See generally Eric
Christensen & Samantha Geffin, GATT Sets Its Net on Environmental Regulation: The
GATT Panel Ruling on Mexican Yellowfin Tuna Imports and the Need for Reform of the
International Trading System, 23 U. Miami Inter-Am. L. Rev. 569 (1991-92); Robert F.
Housman & Durwood Zaelke, Trade, Environment, and Sustainable Development: A Primer,
15 Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 535, 539 n.13 (1992); Robert F. Housman & DurwoodJ.
Zaelke, The Collision of the Environment and Trade: The GATT Tuna/Dolphin Decision, 22
Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,268 (1992); Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Precaution, Participation,
and the "Greening" of International Trade Law, 7J. Envtl. L. & Litig. 57 (1992). See infra note
84 (discussing subsequent challenge to secondary ban by European Union and Netherlands).
78. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 61 Stat. (5), (6) (1947), T.I.A.S. No. 1700,
55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT], reprinted in 4 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,
Basic Instruments and Selected Documents 1 (1969).
79. Earth Island Inst. v. Mosbacher, 746 F. Supp. 964 (N.D. Cal. 1990), affd, 929 F.2d
1449 (9th Cir. 1991).




settlement panel under GATT auspices.81 In strong contrast to the domes-
tic legal process, the oral proceedings and written statements before the
GATT panel were inaccessible to the public.8 2 Moreover, the environmen-
tal groups that initiated the U.S. domestic legal action had no right or
opportunity to appear in oral proceedings before, or to make a formal
written submission to, the GATT panel.83 Representation of the United
States by the Executive Branch, which had implemented the tuna ban only
under a court order, raised additional questions concerning the adequacy
of the spectrum of issues presented to the GATT panel.
The very restrictive public access policies governing GATT dispute
panels appear to be something of an aberration.84 As in GATT dispute
81. GATT, supra note 78, arts. XXII, XXIII (consultation and nullification and impair-
ment); Understanding Regarding Notification, Consultation, Dispute Settlement and Surveil-
lance [hereinafter GATT Understanding], reprinted in Basic Instruments and Selected Docu-
ments 210, 217 (26th Supp. 1980).
82. See GATT Understanding, supra note 81, at Annex para. 6(iv)("Written memoranda
submitted to the panel have been considered confidential, but are made available to the parties
to the dispute.").
83. Dispute settlement in GATT does not provide for participation by private parties as
intervenors or amid. See id. at para. 15 ("Any contracting party having a substantial interest in
the matter before a panel, and having notified this to the Council, should have an opportunity
to be heard by the panel."). In the tuna dolphin dispute, ten other GATT parties and the
European Economic Community made written submissions to the panel, all of which were
critical of the MMPA ban and most of which argued that that action is inconsistent with GATT.
See United States - Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, supra note 77, at 1610-16.
84. The Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations in GATT concluded in
December 1993 with a proposal to establish a new World Trade Organization (WTO) to
replace the GATT as an international institution. See Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization, 33 I.L.M. 15. Revised procedures for the WTO would relax the
confidentiality requirements for dispute settlement somewhat. See Understanding on Rules
and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes para. 18.2, 33 I.L.M. 114, 124, which
states:
Written submissions to the panel or the [newly created] Appellate Body shall be
treated as confidential, but shall be made available to the parties to the dispute.
Nothing in this Understanding shall preclude a party to a dispute from disclosing
statement [sic] of its own positions to the public. Members shall treat as confidential,
information submitted by another Member to the panel or the Appellate Body which
that Member has designated as confidential. A party to a dispute shall also, upon
request of a Member, provide a non-confidential summary of the information
contained in its written submissions that could be disclosed to the public.
Mexico did not seek the adoption of the 1991 tuna panel report at the time of its release, and
the GATT Council rejected a request by the European Union to adopt the report. See GATT
Council Refuses EC Request to Adopt Panel Report on U.S. Tuna Embargo, 9 Int'l Trade Rep
(BNA) 353 (1992). The MMPA also provides for a secondary embargo, designed to discourage
"tuna laundering" by intermediary nations that purchase yellowfin tuna abroad and export it
to the United States. See Earth Island Inst. v. Mosbacher, 785 F. Supp. 826, 829 (N.D. Cal.
1992), rev'd, vacated, and remanded on jurisdictional grounds sub nom. Earth Island Inst. v. Brown,
28 F.3d 76 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 1994 U.S. LEXIS 8025 (U.S. Nov. 14, 1994) (clarifying
scope of secondary embargo). On May 20, 1994, in response to a complaint initiated by the
European Union and the Netherlands, a second GATT dispute settlement panel concluded
that the secondary embargo is inconsistent with the United States' obligation pursuant to the
GATT. United States - Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 842 (1994). In
response, the Office of the United States Trade Respresentative announced that
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settlement, only states can be parties to contentious cases before the ICJ.85
But in contrast to the GATT, the IGJ's oral proceedings are customarily
open and accessible to the public.86 Written pleadings and other documen-
The United States will challenge the dispute settlement panel's failure to provide a
fair hearing and due process, and will ask for a full review of the report, both
substantively and procedurally, by the GATT council, or reconsideration by the panel
in this case. The GATT Council or panel should hold further proceedings in public
and allow non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to participate. In addition, all
documents filed from any source should be immediately made public.
USTR Kantor to Challenge GATT Panel's Failure to Provide Open Hearings and Due Process
Regarding U.S. Tuna Embargoes, Substantive Matters, Office of the United States Trade
Representative Press Release (May 23, 1994). In a discussion of the second report, the GATT
Council is reported to have rejected a proposal along these lines from the United States that
would have opened further Council meetings on that case to the Public. See GATT Focus,
Aug.-Sept. 1994, at 6. Mexico was also said to be considering a request to the GATT Council
to adopt the first tuna report. See Frances Williams, GATT Shuts Door on Environmentalists,
Fin. Times, July 21, 1994, at 6. As of this writing, neither report has been adopted by the
GATT Council and hence neither has yet acquired legal force. See William J. Davey, Dispute
Settlement in GATT, 11 Fordham Int'l L.J. 51, 94 (1987). One of the principal authorities on
the GATT has observed that:
[Tihe GATT tends too often to try to operate in secrecy, attempting to avoid public
and news media accounts of its actions. In recent years, this has become almost a
charade, because many of the key documents, most importantly the early results of a
GATT dispute settlement panel report, leak out almost immediately to the press. For
purposes of gaining a broader constituency among the various policy interested
communities in the world, gaining the trust of those constituencies, enhancing public
understanding, as well as avoiding the "charade" of ineffective attempts to maintain
secrecy, the GATT could go much further in providing "transparency" of its
processes.
John H. Jackson, World Trade Rules and Environmental Policies: Congruence or Conflict?, 49
Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1227, 1255 (1992).
85. Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 34, para. 1, 59 Stat.
1055, 1059, T.S. No. 993 [hereinafter ICJ Statute].
86. Id. at art. 46 ("The hearing in Court shall be public, unless the Court shall decide
otherwise, or unless the parties demand that the public be not admitted."); Rules of Court art.
59 (1978) (same) [hereinafter Rules of Court]; see Shabtai Rosenne, Procedure in the
International Court: A Commentary on the 1978 Rules of the International Court of Justice
129 (1983) (documenting only "two exceptional occasions" when the ICJ held parts of hearings
in closed sessions). Oral hearings before the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ),
which had a similar rule, "in practice... [were] invariably public." Manley 0. Hudson, The
Permanent Court of International Justice 172 (1934). But see 1907 Hague Convention, supra
note 74, at art. 66 (Oral proceedings "are public only if it be so decided by the [arbitral]
tribunal, with the assent of the parties."); 1899 Hague Convention, supra note 74, at art. 41
(same).
Open, public hearings are fundamental to Anglo-American jurisprudence. See Richmond
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580 n.17 (1980) C[H]istorically both civil and
criminal trials have been presumptively open."); id. at 599 (Stewart, J., concurring) Cmhe
First and Fourteenth Amendments clearly give ... the public a right of access to trials .... civil
as well as criminal."); Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 420 (1979) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) ("IThere is little record, if any, of secret proceedings, criminal or civil, having
occurred at any time in known English history."). One commentator gives the following
rationale for this precept:
Persons not called as parties to the suits before the court may nevertheless be
affected, or think themselves likely to be affected, by pending litigation. They should
have the opportunity of learning whether they are thus affected, and of protecting
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tary filings are also ordinarily available to the public by the time the Court
begins oral proceedings and are eventually published.87
Even so, there could be instances similar to the GATT tuna dolphin
dispute in which the parties' arguments do not reflect the full range of
issues presented by the dispute or in which members of the public have
additional significant, relevant information to provide. The Statute of the
Court and its rules anticipate both discretionary intervention88 and inter-
vention as of right by states.89 But because nongovernmental entities
themselves accordingly; they have "a right to be present for the purpose of hearing
what is going on."
In general, therefore, and as a rule, a trial must be conducted in such a way as to
allow the access of the general public.
6 Wigmore on Evidence § 1834 (Chadbourn rev. 1976) (citation omitted).
A number of international human rights instruments explicitly address public access to
domestic adjudicatory processes. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
supra note 16, at art. 14, para. 1 (providing that in criminal cases or cases at law "everyone shall
be entitled to a fair and public hearing," although the public may be excluded "for reasons of
morals, public order.., or national security in a democratic society, or when the interest of
the private lives of the parties so requires," or when justice would be prejudiced); Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, art. 6, at para.
1, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, 228 (same); Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 16, art.
10 ("Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and
impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights and obligations and of any criminal
charge against him.").
87. Rules of Court, supra note 86, at art. 53 (1978) ("The Court may, after ascertaining the
views of the parties, decide that copies of the pleadings and documents annexed shall be made
accessible to the public on or after the opening of the oral proceedings."). The 1978 revision
to the Court's rules altered the previous text, which had required the consent of the parties,
to the current "after ascertaining the views" of the parties before the Court makes its own
decision. The revision also established the date for public release as the commencement of oral
hearings instead of the termination of the case, as previously. See Rosenne, supra note 86, at
118. The PCIJ once rejected a request by a party not to publish written proceedings. Manley
0. Hudson, The Permanent Court of International Justice: 1920-1942, at 560 n.80 (1943).
88. ICJ Statute, supra note 85, at art. 62 ("Should a state consider that it has an interest of
a legal nature which may be affected by the decision in the case, it may submit a request to the
Court to be permitted to intervene."); Rules of Court, supra note 86, at arts. 81, 83-85
(requiring intervening states to describe the legal interest that might be affected and the scope
of the proposed intervention and providing for notification to other parties, which then may
object to the request for intervention). See generally Rosenne, supra note 86, at 175-8 1. There
were few, if any, precedents for Article 62 of the ICJ Statute, which was a "wholly new
concept... [in] international law." C.M. Chinkin, Third-Party Intervention Before the
International Court of Justice, 80 Am. J. Int'l L. 495, 498 (1986).
89. ICJ Statute, supra note 85, at art. 63 ( "Whenever the construction of a convention to
which states other than those concerned in the case are parties is in question ... [such a state]
has the right to intervene in the proceedings."); Rules of Court, supra note 86, at arts. 82-84,
86 (requiring intervening states to identify provisions of international agreement at issue and
to justify intervenor's proposed interpretation and providing for notification to other parties,
which then may object to the request for intervention). See generally Rosenne, supra note 86,
at 177-82. In contrast to Article 62, Article 63 had a direct precursor in the PCIJ's statute and
has been assumed to have the same meaning as its predecessor. D.W. Grieg, Third Party
Rights and Intervention Before the International Court, 32 Va. J. Int'l L. 285, 307 (1992).
Similar provisions appear in the statute of the Permanent Court of Arbitration. See 1907
Hague Convention, supra note 74, at art. 84; 1899 Hague Convention, supra note 74, at art.
56. The ICJ's Statute, supra note 85, articulates less demanding requirements for both
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cannot be parties to a contentious case before the ICJ and cannot be bound
by its judgment, those entities cannot intervene in a proceeding before the
Court.90
In practice, however, the judgment of an international tribunal may
affect the interests of private parties or the public generally no less than
those of third party states.91 Policy reasons justifying intervention by states
in contentious cases before the ICJ apply with similar force to intervention
by nongovernmental entities if there is reason to believe that the states
party to a dispute involving questions of public international law will not
adequately represent particular private interests. Limited participation by
nonstate actors in appropriate cases could reduce the risk of subsequent
duplicative proceedings involving private parties in municipal fora or
international arbitral tribunals in which nonstate entities have standing.
The presence of affected nongovernmental parties would widen perspec-
tives on the underlying dispute, thereby reducing the likelihood of errone-
ous conclusions. Their participation also would make an effective resolu-
tion more likely, especially in cases that involve multiple actors at least some
of which are nongovernmental entities. In situations like GATT dispute
settlement, which has been the subject of significant controversy since the
panel's tuna dolphin report, greater receptivity to private parties as
potential amici could enhance the stature of international adjudication. 92
Private parties might submit additional statements or arguments in
cases like the GATT tuna dolphin dispute in a capacity and manner similar
to that of amicus curiae in domestic law.93 If an international tribunal
discretionary intervention and intervention as of right than for the initiation of a claim by an
aggrieved state. Customary international law contains an implicit "standing" requirement that
ordinarily turns on a demonstration that one state has violated an obligation owed to another.
See Case Concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co., Ltd. (Second Phase) (Belg.
v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3, 32-33; South West Africa Cases (Second Phase) (Eth. & Liber. v. S.
Afr.), 1966 I.C.J. 6, 47; Restatement, supra note 8, § 902.
90. Because as a general matter nonstate actors are not subjects of international law, it
would seem that they technically cannot have a legal interest in a proceeding before the ICJ.
Cf. ICJ Statute, supra note 85, at art. 34, para. 2, art. 66, para. 2 (providing, in both
contentious cases and cases of requests for advisory opinions, for submissions by international
organizations, which cannot be parties in cases before the Court); Protocol on the Statute of
the Court of Justice of the European Economic Community, Apr. 17, 1957, art. 37, para. 2,
298 U.N.T.S. 147, 154 (providing for intervention by private parties in cases before Court of
Justice "except in cases between Member States, between institutions of the Community or
between Member States and institutions of the Community").
91. See, e.g., Committee of U.S. Citizens in Nicar. v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
(unsuccessfully seeking to enforce ICJ judgment as domestic law); Chinkin, supra note 88, at
504 (1986) (identifying Barcelona Traction, 1970 I.CJ. 3 as example in which multinational
corporation might be permitted to intervene).
92. See, e.g., GAT' Focus, Aug.-Sept. 1994, at 6 (describing assertion of United States in
debate in GAIT Council on second tuna panel report that "with the public now more
interested in trade issues, moves for greater openness such as the holding of the public
meeting [of the GATT Council] would impart greater credibility to the GATT system"). Cf.
Chinkin, supra note 88, at 500-01; Lori F. Damrosch, Multilateral Disputes, in The Interna-
tional Court of Justice at a Crossroads 377, 387 (Lori F. Damrosch ed., 1987) (favoring greater
receptivity to intervention); Grieg, supra note 89, at 363-64 (same).
93. At least one author advocates allowing private parties limited rights of participation as
amicus curiae in the ICJ. John T. Miller, Jr., Intervention in Proceedings Before the
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grants amicus status only after approving a written application, to which the
states party to the underlying dispute could respond, then the tribunal
could assure that there is no disruption to the orderly administration of
justice. The tribunal might require an application to document the appli-
cant's interest, the adequacy of representation of that interest by existing
parties and amici, the applicant's potential contribution to satisfactory
resolution of the dispute, the prejudice to the original parties and interve-
nor states if participation is permitted, and the scope of the proposed
submission as amicus curiae.94 If the applicant were permitted to present a
written submission, the tribunal could then decide the additional, distinct
question of whether to hear the applicant during oral proceedings. In light
of the significant potential benefits to the international legal system and the
public and the numerous procedural safeguards available to prevent abuse,
the role of the public in formal, third-party international dispute resolution
demands considerably greater attention than it has received.
IV. NONCONSENsus DECISION-MAKING PROCEDURES
Another consequence of the primacy of states in the international legal
system is the emphasis on consent and consensus in multilateral undertak-
ings. In contrast to law-making techniques in many municipal legal systems,
the "legislative" instruments of multilateral treaties-the principal source of
international environmental law95-are ordinarily adopted by "consensus,"
which in practice implies unanimity. 96 Even after acquiescing in those
agreements' adoption, states may decline to be bound by most multilateral
agreements merely by withholding approval in a subsequent domestic
ratification process. International decision-making characterized by multi-
ple junctures at which the consent of states is necessary can produce
disappointing "lowest common denominator" obligations determined by
International Court of Justice, in 2 The Future of the International Court of Justice 550 (Leo
Gross ed., 1976). Although this piece states that participation by private parties in contentious
cases would "require a rather profound change of approach by the Court," it ultimately
advocates that change. Id. at 560. Miller notes that the true stakeholder in a contentious case
before the ICJ may be a nonstate actor, such as a multinational corporation or an alien denied
equality of treatment, possessing helpful additional information or perspective. Id. at 552-53,
561. He notes that, in at least one instance, the employee of an international organization was
permitted to file a written statement in a proceeding involving review of the judgment of an
administrative tribunal concerning that employee. Id. at 561-62. Miller further argues that the
court ought to regularize this practice by adopting a rule permitting affected employees to
present written statements as a matter of right. Id. at 562. Miller concludes the court could
correct or eliminate the principal drawbacks to the participation of nongovernmental entities
in an amicus capacity - limited availability of pleadings and the potential to delay or
complicate proceedings - through changes to the court's rules and appropriate standards for
reviewing applications to file written statements as amicus curiae. Id. at 560-63.
94. Cf. David L. Shapiro, Some Thoughts on Intervention Before Courts, Agencies, and
Arbitrators, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 721 (1968) (examining, in civil actions, the factors that determine
whether and to what extent intervention is proper).
95. See Wirth, supra note 17, at 380 n.12.
96. Wirth & Lashof, supra note 11, at 108; cf. United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, art. 161, para. 8(e), 21 I.L.M. 1261, 1301 ("'consensus' means the
absence of any formal objection").
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the more reluctant, rather than the more ambitious, participants. 97
Recently, there have been calls for nonconsensus decision-making,
particularly in the environmental field. While wholesale adoption of
majority voting in international law is neither likely nor necessarily desir-
able, limited departures from the principles of consent and consensus in
certain discrete areas can overcome inertial drag and improve the effec-
tiveness of international decision-making processes. For instance, the
Declaration of the Hague, adopted in March 1989 by no fewer than
seventeen heads of state, asserts the need for a new international body that
would exercise some of the sovereign prerogatives of states and operate
pursuant to "such decision-making procedures as may be effective even if,
on occasion, unanimous agreement has not been achieved."98
Amendments to existing multilateral agreements are particularly
promising candidates for nonconsensus techniques. Under customary
international law, an amendment to a multilateral treaty is binding only on
those states that indicate their affirmative intent to accept the revised
obligations, ordinarily through ratification or acceptance of the
amendment. 99 In effect, an amendment is a new agreement under inter-
national law.
Unfortunately, the fit between the law and many environmental
problems is poor. Scientific knowledge, the touchstone of multilateral
environmental negotiations, can change rapidly. Consequently, multilateral
environmental agreements typically establish ongoing consultations among
parties, including in some cases scheduled reviews of treaty provisions in
light of new scientific developments.100 Repeated amendments may create
classes of parties with different obligations. In the case of complex
regulatory instruments, such as the recent multilateral agreements on
international trade in waste' 01 and protection of the stratospheric ozone
layer,10 2 an otherwise highly desirable reevaluation of international obliga-
tions may disrupt or destroy the effectiveness of the treaty regime.
Presumably for this reason, the Montreal Protocol on Substances that
Deplete the Ozone Layer rejects the customary rule of consensus by
explicitly stating that a two-thirds majority may adopt "adjustments" to the
agreement's reduction schedule.' 03 Such adjustments then are binding on
97. E.g., Sand, supra note 71, at 5. Obligations of an agreement may not enter into force
for some time after adoption because of the delay required for ratification and the lag until a
critical mass of states triggers entry into force, a related but distinct effect sometimes knovm
as the "slowest boat" phenomenon. Id. at 14-18.
98. Declaration of the Hague on the Environment, supra note 16, at para 10(a).
99. See, e.g., Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 22, 1969, art. 40(4), S. Exec.
Doc. No. L, 1, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1971), 8 I.L.M. 679, 695, reprinted in 63 Am.J. Int'l L.
875, 888 (1969). Although not in force for the United States, the Executive Branch has
accepted this instrument as a codification of customary international law regarding interna-
tional agreements. See S. Exec. Doc. No. L, 1, supra, at 1; Restatement, supra note 8, at part
III introductory note (1987).
100. E.g., Montreal Protocol, supra note 10, at art. 6.
101, See Basel Convention, supra note 9.
102. See Montreal Protocol, supra note 10.
103. Id. at art. 2, para. 9(c).
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all parties to the original instrument. 10 4
Outside the field of international environmental law, nonconsensus
amendment rules, even in international "constitutional" instruments, are
established even more firmly. The World Bank's constituent treaties, for
instance, provide for most amendments to become effective for all mem-
bers upon approval by three-fifths of the Bank's members holding four-
fifths of the total weighted voting power.'05 Although in practice a formal
vote is rare, 06 in theory other members could adopt amendments to the
Bank's constitutional instruments over the objection of the United States,
which, as the institution's largest single shareholder, still holds less than
twenty percent of the weighted votes in the component institutions of the
Bank. Likewise, the constituent agreements of the International Monetary
Fund (IMF), 10 7 the four regional development banks of which the United
States is a member,108 the ILO,'09 the World Health Organization
(WHO)," 0 the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA),"' and the
104. Id. at art. 2, para 9(d). See generally Wirth & Lashof, supra note 11, at 110 (discussing
distinction between adjustment and amendment).
105. The Bank comprises several "windows," each of which technically is a separate
international organization, including the International Development Association, see Articles
of Agreement of the International Development Association, Jan. 26, 1960, art. IX, 11 U.S.T.
2284, 2307, T.I.A.S. No. 4607, 439 U.N.T.S. 249, 286, 288; the International Finance
Corporation, see Articles of Agreement of the International Finance Corporation, May 25,
1955, art. VII, 7 U.S.T. 2197, 2217, T.I.A.S. No. 3620, 264 U.N.T.S. 117, 146; and the
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, see Artides of Agreement of the
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Dec. 27, 1945, art. VIII, 60 Stat.
1440, T.I.A.S. No. 1502, 2 U.N.T.S. 134, 184, 186, amended Aug. 25, 1965, 16 U.S.T. 1942,
T.I.A.S. No. 5929.
106. See Stephen Zamora, Voting in International Economic Organizations, 74 Am.J. Int'l
L. 566, 568 (1980).
107. Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, Dec. 27, 1945, art. XVII,
60 Stat. 1401; T.I.A.S. No. 1501, 2 U.N.T.S. 39, amended May 31, 1968, 20 U.S.T. 2775,
T.I.A.S. No. 6748, amended Apr. 30, 1976, 29 U.S.T. 2203, T.I.A.S. No. 8937.
108. Agreement Establishing the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development,
May 29, 1990, art. 56, 29 I.L.M. 1083; Agreement Establishing the Asian Development Bank,
Dec. 4, 1965, art. 59, 17 U.S.T. 1418, 1452-53, T.I.A.S. No. 6103, 571 U.N.T.S. 123, 196, 198;
Agreement Establishing the African Development Bank, Aug. 4, 1963, art. 60, 510 U.N.T.S.
3, 106, 108, amended May 17, 1979; Agreement Establishing the Inter-American Development
Bank, Apr. 8, 1959, art. XII, 10 U.S.T. 3029, 3096-97, T.I.A.S. No. 4397, 389 U.N.T.S. 69,
132, 134, amended Jan. 28, 1964, 21 U.S.T. 1570, T.I.A.S. No. 6920, amended Mar. 31, 1968,
19 U.S.T. 7381, T.I.A.S. No. 6591, amended Mar. 23, 1972,23 U.S.T. 2455, T.I.A.S. No. 7437,
851 U.N.T.S. 283, amended June 1, 1976, 27 U.S.T. 3547, T.I.A.S. No. 8383, amended Jan. 27,
1977, T.I.A.S. No. 10,875.
109. ILO Constitution, supra note 36, at art. 36. Amendments bind all parties when
adopted by a two-thirds majority of the annual Conference, one-half of whom represent
workers and employers, not governments. Id. Amendments enter into force after ratification
or acceptance by two-thirds of members of the Organization, including at least five of the ten
states of chief industrial importance. Id. A pending amendment to the ILO's Constitution,
which was adopted in 1986 but has not yet entered into force, would require adoption by
three-fourths vote for certain amendments to the Constitution, which then would enter into
force only upon ratification by three quarters of the members of the Organization. Instrument
of Amendment of the Constitution of the International Labour Organisation, 69 Off. Bull.,
Ser. B, 60, 66-67 (1986), 72 Rec. Proc. 36/1, 36/7 (1986).
110. Constitution of the World Health Organization, July 22, 1946, art. 73, 62 Stat. 2679,
T.I.A.S. No. 1808, 14 U.N.T.S. 185, amended May 23, 1967, 26 U.S.T. 990, T.I.A.S. No. 8086,
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World Intellectual Property Organization 12 provide for amendments that
become effective for all members upon approval by a qualified majority." 3
Decisions taken pursuant to an established international-typically
treaty - regime are a second area where nonconsensus decision-making
may be particularly palatable. The Board of Executive Directors of the
World Bank, for example, exercises quasi-legislative authority in approving
loan proposals by weighted majority vote. 114 The IMF and the regional
banks have similar majority voting rules in their constitutional
instruments." 5
amended May 22, 1978,28 U.S.T. 2088, T.I.A.S. No. 8534, amended May 17, 1976, T.I.A.S. No.
10,930 (amendments enter into force for all members after adoption by two-thirds majority
and ratification or acceptance by two-thirds of member states) [hereinafter WHO Constitu-
tion].
111. Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Oct. 26, 1956, art. XVIII, para. C,
8 U.S.T. 1093, T.I.A.S. No. 3873, 276 U.N.T.S. 4, amended Oct. 4, 1961, 14 U.S.T. 135,
T.I.A.S. No. 5284, 471 U.N.T.S. 333, amended Sept. 28, 1970, 24 U.S.T. 1637, T.I.A.S. No.
7668, amended Sept. 27, 1984 (amendments enter into force for all parties after adoption by
two-thirds vote and acceptance or ratification by two-thirds of all member states).
112. Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization, July 14, 1967,
art. 17, paras. 2 & 3, 21 U.S.T. 1749, T.I.A.S. No. 6932, 828 U.N.T.S. 3, amended Oct. 2, 1979
(amendments adopted by simple majority vote and enter into force for all parties after
ratification or acceptance by three-fourths of all member states).
113. These situations are distinguishable from those in which a majority or qualified
majority can adopt amendments that bind only those states that subsequently ratify, accept, or
approve the amendments. See, e.g., Espoo Convention, supra note 14, at art. 14, paras. 3, 4, 30
I.LM. 802, 809-10 (not in force) (three-fourths majority); Basel Convention, supra note 9, at
art. 17, paras. 3, 5 (three-fourths majority); Vienna Convention for the Protection of the
Ozone Layer, March 22, 1985, art. 9, paras. 3, 5, T.I.A.S. No. 11,097, 26 I.L.M. 1516, 1532-33
(three-fourths majority), reprinted in 14 Envtl. Pol'y & L. 72, 74 (1985), and in Int'l Env't Rep.
(BNA) 21:3101, at :3103; cf. ILO Constitution, supra note 36, at art. 19, paras. 2 & 5
(multilateral conventions adopted by two-thirds majority vote of conference, including
workers' and employers' delegates, but bind only states that subsequently ratify); WHO
Constitution, supra note 110, at art. 19 (multilateral conventions adopted by two-thirds
majority vote but bind only states that subsequently become parties).
114. See Zamora, supra note 106, at 589-92 (characterizing Board votes as legitimizing
decisions made by staff, and weighted majority voting as most successful in technical areas that
rarely directly affect important interests of individual states).
115. See Agreement Establishing the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development,
supra note 108, at art. 29, paras. 2, 3; Articles of Agreement Establishing the Asian
Development Bank, supra note 108, at art. 33, paras. 2, 3; Agreement Establishing the African
Development Bank, supra note 108, at art. 35, para. 3; Articles of Agreement of the
International Development Association, supra note 105, at art. VI, sec. 3, para. b; Agreement
Establishing the Inter-American Development Bank, supra note 108, at art. VIII, sec. 4, paras.
b & c; Articles of Agreement of the International Finance Corporation, supra note 105, at art.
IV, sec. 3, para. b; Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development, supra note 105, at art. V, sec. 3, para. b; Articles of Agreement of the
International Monetary Fund, supra note 107, at art. XII, sec. 5, para. d; see also Chayes &
Chayes, Adjustment and Compliance, supra note 41, at 284-85 (discussing IMF). With the
exception of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, which is still too new,
these institutions have all been targets of environmental criticism. See Patricia Adams, Odious
Debts: Loose Lending, Corruption, and the Third World's Environmental Legacy (1991);
Raymond F. Mikesell & Larry Williams, International Banks and the Environment: From
Growth to Sustainability: An Unfinished Agenda (1992); Bruce Rich, Mortgaging the Earth:
The World Bank, Environmental Impoverishment, and the Crisis of Development (1994);
Robert E. Stein & Brian Johnson, Banking on the Biosphere? (1979) (case studies of World
Bank, Inter-American Development Bank, Asian Development Bank, Caribbean Develop-
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Majority voting may be especially desirable for highly scientific and
technical matters often associated with other policy, legal, and economic
issues in the environmental field. While not a true nonconsensus approach,
a number of maritime pollution agreements incorporate specific, stream-
lined provisions for establishing technical requirements. Most notable are
those for the protection of the Mediterranean' 16 and Caribbean 1 7 Seas and
the South Pacific region, 18 and the prevention of marine pollution by
ships 1 9 and from dumping at sea.120 Similar rules govern the establishment
of harvest limits under the International Convention for the Regulation of
Whaling' 2' and the Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals. 122
ment Bank, African Development Bank, Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa,
European Development Fund, UN Development Program, and Organization of American
States); Pat Aufderheide & Bruce Rich, Environmental Reform and the Multilateral Banks, 5
World Pol'y J. 301 (1988); John Horberry, The Accountability of Development Assistance
Agencies: The Case of Environmental Policy, 12 Ecology L.Q. 817 (1985) (case studies of
United States Agency for International Development, World Bank, and UN Food and
Agriculture Organization); Zygmunt J.B. Plater, Damming the Third World: Multilateral
Development Banks, Environmental Diseconomies, and International Reform Pressures on
the Lending Process, 17 Denv. J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 121 (1988), revised and reprinted in 9 B.C. Third
World L.J. 169 (1989); Bruce Rich, The Multilateral Development Banks, Environmental
Policy, and the United States, 12 Ecology L.Q. 681 (1985); Bruce Rich, The Emperor's New
Clothes: The World Bank and Environmental Reform, 7 World Pol'y J. 305 (1990); David A.
Wirth, The World Bank and the Environment, Env't, Dec. 1986, at 33-34; Wirth, supra note
61. This criticism stems in part from the perceived concentration of power in these institutions'
professional staffs, which in turn arguably derives from majority decision-making processes.
However, environmental considerations do not necessarily counsel abandonment of majority
voting. Instead, solutions to these problems are more likely to come from greater account-
ability directly to the public through more open decision-making and improved opportunities
for public participation.
116. Convention for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea Against Pollution, Feb. 16,
1976, at art. 17, para. 2, reprinted in 15 I.L.M. 290, 294-95, and in Kiss, supra note 44, at 448,
and in 2 Envtl. Pol'y & L. 45, 46 (1976), and in Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 35:0301, :0302
(three-fourths majority).
117. Convention for the Protection and Development of the Marine Environment of the
Wider Caribbean Region, Mar. 24, 1983, at art. 19, para. 2, T.I.A.S. No. 11,085,22 I.L.M. 227,
233-34 (three-fourths majority), reprinted in Rummel-Bulska & Osafo, supra note 9, at 258, and
in Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 21:3201, :3203.
118. Convention for the Protection of the Natural Resources and Environment of the South
Pacific Region, Nov. 24, 1986, at art. 25, para. 2, 26 I.L.M. 41, 52 (three-fourths majority),
reprinted in Rummel-Bulska & Osafo, supra note 9, at 372, and in Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA)
21:3171, :3175.
119. Protocol of 1978 Relating to the International Convention for the Prevention of
Pollution from Ships, Feb. 17, 1978, at art. VI, 17 I.L.M. 546, 549 (two-thirds majority)
(incorporating by reference at art. 16 of 1973 International Convention for the Prevention of
Pollution from Ships), reprinted in Kiss, supra note 44, at 382, and in Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA)
21:2381.
120. Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other
Matter, Dec. 29, 1972, at art. XV, para. 2, 26 U.S.T. 2403, 2413, 1046 U.N.T.S. 120, 144, 11
I.L.M. 1294, 1307 (two-thirds majority), reprinted in Kiss, supra note 44, at 283, and in Int'l
Env't Rep. (BNA) 21:1901, :1904.
121. Dec. 2, 1946, at art. III, para. 2, at art. V, para. 3, 62 Stat. 1716, 1717, 1719
(three-fourths majority) [hereinafter Whaling Convention], reprinted in Kiss, supra note 44, at
67.
122. June 1, 1972, at art. 9, para. 3, 11 I.L.M. 251, 256 (two-thirds majority), reprinted in
Kiss, supra note 44, at 272 (two-thirds majority).
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These agreements set out simplified mechanisms for adopting or
amending technical annexes that require approval by only a qualified
majority of states. After a specified "opt-out" period, those actions then
become binding on all states that have not objected to them.123 In principle,
the consequences of publicly rejecting an international standard-the
"mobilization of shame"-tends to discourage states from opting out. 124
Other treaties contain even further refinements. By a two-thirds majority,
the Council of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) can
adopt international standards and recommended practices, which are then
binding on all members unless disapproved by a majority.125 It would be a
small but significant step to remove the opt-out provisions from these
models. Indeed, the "adjustments" to the Montreal Protocol adopted by a
two-thirds super-majority 26 can be considered a special case of these
precedents.
Assuring the procedural integrity of streamlined decision-making
processes may facilitate further progress toward the adoption of noncon-
census approaches. One possibility for streamlining these procedures might
be to establish the role of scientific information and methodologies in
resolving scientific uncertainties.127 Avenues for challenging and reviewing
123. Cf. Single European Act, at 5 (Supp. No. 2 1986), Feb. 17 & 28, 1986, at art. 18, 19
Bull. Eur. Comm., reprinted in 25 I.L.M. 506 (adding new article 100A, paragraph 4, to Treaty
of Rome specifying that "[ilf, after the adoption of a [Community-wide] harmonization
measure by the Council acting by a qualified majority, a Member State deems it necessary to
apply national provisions ...relating to protection of the environment or the working
environment, it shall notify the Commission of these provisions. The Commission shall
confirm the provisions involved after having verified that they are not a means of arbitrary
discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade between Member States.").
124. See Sand, supra note 71, at 18. But see Gare Smith, The International Whaling
Commission: An Analysis of the Past and Reflections on the Future, 16 Nat. Resources Law.
543, 559 (1984) ("Most of the [Whaling Convention's] difficulty in regulating the whaling
industry can be attributed to the immunity granted whaling countries by the objection
(opt-out) clause and the [Convention's] inability to sanction noncomplying nations.").
125. Convention on International Civil Aviation (Chicago Convention), Dec. 7, 1944, at art.
90, para. a, 61 Stat. 1180, 15 U.N.T.S. 295, amendedJune 14,1954,8 U.S.T. 179,320 U.N.T.S.
21, amended Sept. 15, 1962, 26 U.S.T. 2374, 1008 U.N.T.S. 213, amended July 7, 1971, 26
U.S.T. 1061, amended Oct. 16, 1974, 32 U.S.T. 322. See Chayes & Chayes, Adjustment &
Compliance, supra note 41, at 285; Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr., The Promulgation of International
Norms in the UN System by Nontraditional Methods, in United Nations Legal Order (Oscar
Schachter & Christopher C. Joyner eds., 1994) (in press); Sand, supra note 71, at 18-20.
126. See supra note 104.
127. See Rio Declaration, supra note 13, Principle 15 ( "In order to protect the environment,
the precautionary approach shall be widely applied by States according to their capabilities.
Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall
not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental
degradation."); Climate Convention, supra note 11, at art. 3, para. 3 ("The Parties should take
precautionary measures to anticipate, prevent or minimize the causes of climate change and
mitigate its adverse effects. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of
full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing such measures .... );
see also Daniel Bodansky, Scientific Uncertainty and the Precautionary Principle, Env't, Sept.
1991, at 4; James Cameron & Juli Abouchar, The Precautionary Principle: A Fundamental
Principle of Law and Policy for the Protection of the Global Environment, 14 B.C. Int'l &
Comp. L. Rev., Winter 1991, at 1; Lothar Gundling, The Status in International Law of the
Principle of Precautionary Action, in The North Sea: Perspectives on Regional Environmental
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nonconsensus decisions and verifying scientific information-similar to the
United States system ofjudicial review of administrative action,128 although
not necessarily relying on courts for implementation-might be created for
aggrieved states. Alternatively, states bound by decisions with which they
disagree might have the right to request early reconsideration of that
action. In any case, the potential utility of these nonconsensus decision
models has yet to be fully appreciated by the international community.
CONCLUSION
Procedure matters, not only domestically but also in international
decision-making processes. The structure of international procedures can
affect the substantive content of international law. Especially for an area
like environment, in which international norms may be thin or ineffective
in responding to real-world imperatives, multilateral procedures assume
commensurately greater significance. As the fiction that states and govern-
ments adequately represent the interests of nongovernmental actors under
their jurisdiction becomes increasingly difficult to maintain, the regularity
and transparency of procedures in public international law acquire ever
more importance.
Some situations may even elude direct treatment by substantive law.
For example, the "precautionary principle," which asserts that govern-
ments should not delay implementing needed regulatory measures because
of uncertainties in scientific data, is now well accepted. 129 However,
applying the principle to a wide variety of environmental risks is difficult in
practice.130 Likewise, even if states acknowledged an international legal
right to a minimally acceptable environment,131 the content of that right
would be very difficult to define and its application to particular cases a task
of formidable proportions.13 2 In such settings, process-oriented rights are
Cooperation 23 (David Freestone & Ton Ijlstra eds., 1990); Ellen Hey, The Precautionary
Concept in Environmental Policy and Law: Institutionalizing Caution, 4 Geo. Int'l Envtl. L.
Rev. 303 (1992); Bernard A. Weintraub, Note, Science, International Environmental Regu-
lation, and the, Precautionary Principle: Setting Standards and Defining Terms, 1 N.Y.U.
Envtl. LJ. 173 (1992).
128. See supra text accompanying note 38.
129. See supra note 127.
130. Cf. William A. Nitze, Acid Rain: A United States Policy Perspective, in International
Law and Pollution 329, 332-36 (Daniel B. Magraw ed., 1991) (discussion by U.S. Deputy
Assistant Secretary of State for Environment, Health and Natural Resources emphasizing
uncertainties with respect to causes and effects of acid precipitation as basis for delaying
regulatory control measures).
131. See supra note 16.
132. Constitutions of at least two states that articulate governmental duties to safeguard
environmental integrity explicitly state that those provisions are not enforceable through
judicial processes. Const. of India, pt. 4, at art. 37, reprinted in 8 Constitutions of the Countries
of the World (Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert H. Flanz eds.), India, at 62 (1990) (provisions "shall
not be enforceable by any court, but the principles therein laid down are nevertheless
fundamental in the governance of the country and it shall be the duty of the State to apply
these principles in making laws"); Const. of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, ch.
VI, at art. 29, reprinted in 18 Constitutions of the Countries of the World, supra, Sri Lanka, at
24 (1989) (provisions "do not confer or impose legal rights or obligations, and are not
enforceable in any court or tribunal. No question of inconsistency with such provisions shall
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useful for filling substantive gaps. Apart from any nexus with substantive
law, procedural integrity is itself an important source of authority and
legitimacy for international law.133
The recent explosion in the number of international meetings on the
global environment,134 including most notably the 1992 Earth Summit, has
presented numerous opportunities for *addressing procedural rights for the
be raised in any court or tribunal."); cf. Robb v. Shockoe Slip Found., 324 S.E.2d 674,676 n.2,
677 (Va. 1985) (holding that at art. XI, § 1 of Constitution of Virginia, establishing
conservation policy "[t]o the end that the people have clean air, pure water, and the use and
enjoyment for recreation of adequate public lands, waters, and other natural resources," is not
self-executing and therefore is nonjusticiable). See generally Mary E. Cusack, Note, Judicial
Interpretation of State Constitutional Rights to a Healthful Environment, 20 B.C. Envtl. Aff.
L. Rev. 173 (1993).
133. Cf. Thomas M. Franck, The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations 91-134 (1990)
(symbolic validation as element of legitimacy).
134. Between 1988 and the Earth Summit, held in June 1992, the number of ministerial-
level meetings addressing global warming alone, either directly or indirectly, was overwhelm-
ing. Among the more significant of these gatherings in North America and Europe are: an
international meeting hosted by the Government of Canada, see The Changing Atmosphere:
Implications for Global Security (statement from international meeting sponsored by Govern-
ment of Canada in Toronto, June 27-30, 1988), reprinted in 5 Am. U. J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 515
(1990); an international meeting attended by seventeen heads of state in the Hague, see
Declaration of the Hague on the Environment, supra note 16; a second ministerial conference
hosted by the Dutch government, see The Noordwijk Declaration on Atmospheric Pollution
and Climatic Change (statement of ministerial conference sponsored by Government of the
Netherlands in Noordwijk, Nov. 7, 1989), reprinted in 5 Am. U. J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 592 (1990),
and in 19 Envd. Pol'y & L. 229 (1989), and in [12 Current Rep.] Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 624
(1989); yet another ministerial conference hosted by the Norwegian government, held in
preparation for UNCED and addressing climate and other environmental issues, see Bergen
Ministerial Declaration on Sustainable Development in the ECE Region (statement of
ministerial conference sponsored by Government of Norway in Bergen, May 16, 1990)
reprinted in 20 Envd. Pol'y & L. 100 (1990); and the Second World Climate Conference, see
Ministerial Declaration, Second World Climate Conference (statement from international
meeting in Geneva, Oct. 29-Nov. 7, 1990), reprinted in 20 Envd. Pol'y & L. 220 (1990).
Simultaneously, the same issue has featured prominently in such established fora as the UN
General Assembly, see Protection of Global Climate for Present and Future Generations of
Mankind, G.A. Res. 195, 47 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 49, at 49, U.N. Doc. A147/49 (1992),
reprinted in 23 Envtl. Pol'y & L. 44 (1993); G.A. Res. 169, U.N. GAOR 46th Sess., Supp. No.
49, at 130, U.N. Doc. A/46/49 (1991); G.A. Res. 212, U.N. GAOR 45th Sess., Supp. No. 49A,
at 147, U.N. Doc. A/45/49 (1990), reprinted in 21 Envtl. Pol'y & L. 76 (1991); G.A. Res. 207,
U.N. GAOR 44th Sess., Supp. No. 25, at 130, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (1990), reprinted in 20 Envtl.
Pol'y & L. 43 (1990); G.A. Res. 53, U.N. GAOR 43d Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 133, U.N. Doc.
A/43/49 (1989), reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 1326, and in 5 Am. U. J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 525 (1990), and
in 19 Envtl. Pol'y & L. 27 (1989), and the annual meetings at the head-of-state level of the
Group of Seven (G-7) industrialized countries, see Summit Communiqud (statement of G-7 in
Naples, July 9, 1994) [hereinafter Naples Summit Communique] (unpublished document, on
file in the Iowa Law Libraiy); Tokyo Summit Economic Declaration: A Strengthened Commit-
ment to Jobs and Growth (statement of G-7 in Tokyo, July 9, 1993) [hereinafter Tokyo
Summit Economic Declaration] (unpublished document, on file in the Iowa Law Libray);
Munich Economic Summit Declaration (statement of G-7 in Munich, July 7, 1992), reprinted in
28 Wkly. Comp. Pres. Doc. 1222 (1992); Economic Declaration: Building World Partnership
(statement of G-7 in London, July 17, 1991), reprinted in 27 Wkly. Comp. Pres. Doc. 968
(1991); Houston Economic Declaration (statement of G-7 in Houston,July 11, 1990), reprinted
in 26 Wkly. Comp. Pres. Doc. 1073 (1990); Paris Economic Summit Economic Declaration
(statement of G-7 in Paris, July 16, 1989), reprinted in 25 Wkly. Comp. Pres. Doc. 1101 (1989),




public and analyzing the effectiveness of international decision-making
procedures. The intent behind UNCED, which was self-consciously de-
signed to stimulate change on such pervasive issues of structure, institution,
and principle, went even further135 But neither the binding multilateral
conventions136 nor the aspirational declarations13 7 that resulted from the
Rio meeting necessarily hold the greatest promise for improving the
accountability and efficacy of international decision-making mechanisms.
Rather, Agenda 21,131 the action plan for the future adopted by more
than one hundred heads of state in Brazil, directed the establishment of a
new Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD)139 that would report
to the UN's Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). The principal
mandate of the CSD, a "sleeper" at the Earth Summit but potentially one of
its most significant long-term developments, is to monitor and review the
implementation of Agenda 21 by states, international organizations, and
multilateral environmental treaty regimes. The Commission will also pro-
vide a permanent forum for multilateral discussion of sustainable
development-the nexus between environment and development that was
the central theme of the Rio conference. The members of the Commission
135. Strong, supra note 5, at 290 (statement by Secretary General of United Nations
Conference on Environment and Development that purpose of UNCED was to "move
environmental issues into the center of economic policy and decision making").
136. See Convention on Biological Diversity, supra note 12; Climate Convention, supra note
11.
137. See Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, supra note 13. In addition to
the Rio Declaration, UNCED also adopted an instrument entitled Non-Legally Binding
Authoritative Statement of Principles for a Global Consensus on the Management, Conser-
vation and Sustainable Development of All Types of Forests, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 882, and in
Johnson, supra note 11, at 111, and in 3 Robinson, supra note 11, at 1745, and in 22 Envtl.
Pol'y & L. 269 (1992).
138. See Agenda 21, para. 1.3, reprinted in Johnson, supra note 11, at 129 ( "Agenda 21
reflects a global consensus and political commitment at the highest level on development
and environment cooperation."). See generally G.A. Preparatory Committee for the United
Nations Conference on Evironment and Development, 4th Sess., Agenda Item 2(c), at 1, U.N.
Doc. AICONF.151/PC1100/Add.1 (1992), reprinted in 1 Robinson, supra note 11, at 53
(UNCED Secretary General's overview of Agenda 21 and implementation mechanisms);
Johnson, supra note 11, at 125-26; Peter H. Sand, International Law on the Agenda of the
1992 "Earth Summit," 3 Colo. J. Int'l Envtl. L. & Pol'y 343, 351 (1992) (statement of Principal
Program Officer for UNCED); Strong, supra note 5, at 293; Edith Brown Weiss, Introductory
Note to UNCED Documents in 31 I.L.M. 814, 814-15; Marc A. Levy, UNCED: Mileposts
Along the Road from Rio, Env't, June 1993, at 4 (describing implementation of Agenda 21).
While the precise legal status of Agenda 21 or any individual portion of it is not entirely clear,
the instrument as a whole clearly is not binding on states under international law. See supra
sources cited note 13 (distinguishing "soft" law).
139. Agenda 21, paras. 38.11-.14, reprinted in Johnson, supra note 11, at 490; 22 Envtl. Pol'y
& L. 271, 297 (1992); G.A. Res. 191, U.N. GAOR 47th Sess., 93d plen. mtg., Supp. No. 49, at
141, U.N. Doc. A/47/49 (1992), reprinted in 23 Envtl. Pol'y & L. 41 (1993); 32 I.L.M. 254
(institutional arrangements to follow up United Nations Conference on Environment and
Development, noting in paragraph 2 the need to "rationalize the intergovernmental decision-
making capacity for the integration of environment and development issues"). See generally
Kathryn G. Sessions, Institutionalizing the Earth Summit: The United Nations Commission on
Sustainable Development (1992); Lee A. Kimball & William C. Boyd, International Institu-
tional Arrangements for Environment and Development: A Post-Rio Assessment, 1 Rev. Eur.
Community & Int'l Envd. L. 295 (1992); Jared Blumenfeld, The United Nations Commission
on Sustainable Development, Env't., Dec. 1994, at 2.
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are governmental representatives of fifty-three states. 140 Additionally, the
Secretary-General has appointed a twenty-one member High-Level Advi-
sory Board of independent experts to assist him in working with the
Commission. 141
A portion of the Commission's mandate addresses the role of nonstate
actors, including nongovernmental organizations, the scientific commu-
nity, the private sector, and women's groups, which Agenda 21 expressly
anticipates will play a role in the CSD's deliberations. 142 A separate portion
of Agenda 21, addressing the role of nongovernmental organizations
140. The Commission on Sustainable Development met for its first annual substantive
session in New York fromJune 14-25, 1993, with Razali Ismail, the Permanent Representative
of Malaysia to the United Nations from Malaysia, as chair. See U.N. ESCOR, 1993 Substantive
Sess., at 1, U.N. Doc. E/CN.17/1993/3/Add.1 (1993) (report of Commission on Sustainable
Development on first session); see also Naples Summit Communiqud, supra note 134
(paragraph 3 on environment, which "support[s] the work of the Commission on Sustainable
Development in reviewing progress in the implementation of the Rio process."); Tokyo
Summit Economic Declaration, supra note 134, 8 ( "welcom[ing] the successful first meeting
of the Commission on Sustainable Development"); William K. Stevens, Panel on Ecology
Showing Progress: Follow-Up to Earth Summit Cuts North-South Tension and U.S. Wins
Praise, N.Y. Times, June 26, 1993, at 5. The Commission's second session in May 1994, with
German Environment Minister Klaus Topfer as chair, was thought in some quarters to fall
short of realizing the new institution's full potential. See Paul Lewis, Panel Finds Lag in Saving
Environment, N.Y. Times, May 29, 1994, § 1, at 13. The United Nations in New York
provides secretariat services for the Commission. The U.S. Government has established a
parallel domestic advisory committee, the President's Council on Sustainable Development.
Exec. Order No. 12,852, 58 Fed. Reg. 35,841 (1993).
141. See U.N. Doc. SG/A/548 ENV/DEV/211 (1993) (press release entitled "Secretary-
General Appoints 21-Person Advisory Board on Sustainable Development"); cf. Treaty of
Rome, supra note 67, arts. 193-198 (establishing advisory Economic and Social Committee of
experts appointed in their personal capacities consisting of "representatives of the various
categories of economic and social life, in particular, representatives of producers, agricultur-
ists, transport operators, workers, merchants, artisans, the liberal professions and represen-
tatives of the general interest," which may be consulted by Council or Commission or act on
its own initiative); Single European Act, supra note 123, at art. 25 (adding new article 130S,
para. 1, to Treaty of Rome, requiring consultation with Economic and Social Committee
before Council acts on Commission proposals concerning environment); Maastricht Treaty,
supra note 70, at art. G, paras. 64-66 (modifying composition of Committee); see Case 297/86,
Confederazione Italiana Dirigenti di Azienda (CIDA) v. Council, 1988 E.C.R. 3531. See
generally Emile Noel, The Institutions of the European Community, 15 Suffolk Transnat'l LJ.
514, 553-54 (1992).
142. The United Nations system generally, and the CSD in particular, are instructed to:
(a) [d]esign open and effective means to achieve the participation of non-
governmental organisations ... in the process established to review and evaluate the
implementation of Agenda 21 at all levels and promote their contribution to it; [and]
(b) [t]ake into account the findings of review systems and evaluation processes of
non-governmental organisations in relevant reports of the Secretary-General to the
General Assembly and all pertinent United Nations agencies and intergovernmental
organisations and forums concerning implementation of Agenda 21 in accordance
with its review process.
Agenda 21, para. 38.43, reprinted in Johnson, supra note 11, at 497, and in 22 Envtl. Pol'y &
L. at 299. Moreover, "[s]uch organisations should have access to reports and other information
produced by the United Nations system." Agenda 21, supra, at para. 38.44. Cf. sources cited
supra note 14 (discussing access to information on international level). Further, "[p]rocedures
should be established for an expanded role for non-governmental organisations" in the work
of the Commission. Agenda 21, supra, para. 38.44. See also G.A. Res. 191, supra note 139, at
paras. 3(f), 7(b), 8(a) (establishing institutional role for nongovernmental organizations).
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throughout multilateral activities, augments the force of this directive. 143
Similarly, Agenda 21 also calls for improved mechanisms for international
oversight, implementation, and dispute settlement as part of a "further
development of international law on sustainable development," 144 includ-
ing, presumably, progress in international environmental law.
Over time, both formal and informal access for nonstate actors into the
Commission's decision-making processes, similar to those now existing in
the ILO supervisory machinery 45 and the UN Commission on Human
Rights, 146 might evolve. Further, as suggested by its title, Agenda 21 is
merely the starting point for continued international action by the Com-
mission on Sustainable Development. The Commission could, consistent
with the intent of UNCED, adopt concrete measures promoting further
143. As specified in paragraph 27.9 of Agenda 21, reprinted in Johnson, supra note 11, at
420-21, and in 22 Envtl. Pol'y & L. at 292:
The United Nations system, including international finance and development
agencies, and all intergovernmental organisations and forums should, in consultation
with non-governmental organisations, take measures to:
(a) Review and report on ways of enhancing existing procedures and mechanisms
by which non-governmental organisations contribute to policy design, decision-
making, implementation and evaluation at the individual agency level, in inter-
agency discussions and in United Nations conferences;
(b) On the basis of subparagraph (a) above, enhance existing or, where they do
not exist, establish, mechanisms and procedures within each agency to draw on the
expertise and views of non-governmental organisations in policy and programme
design, implementation and evaluation;
(c) Review levels of financial and administrative support for non-governmental
organisations and the extent and effectiveness of their involvement in project and
programme implementation, with a view to augmenting their role as social partners;
(d) Design open and effective means of achieving the participation of non-
governmental organisations in the processes established to review and evaluate the
implementation of Agenda 21 at all levels;
(e) Promote and allow non-governmental organisations and their self-organised
networks to contribute to the review and evaluation of policies and programmes
designed to implement Agenda 21, including support for developing country
non-governmental organisations and their self-organised networks;
(f) Take into account the findings of non-governmental review systems and
evaluation processes in relevant reports of the Secretary-General to the General
Assembly, and of all pertinent United Nations organisations and other intergovern-
mental organisations and forums concerning implementation of Agenda 21, in
accordance with the review process for Agenda 21;
(g) Provide access for non-governmental organisations to accurate and timely
data and information to promote the effectiveness of their programmes and activities
and their roles in support of sustainable development.
144. Agenda 21, para. 39.1(a), reprinted in Johnson, supra note 11, at 500, and in 22 Envtl.
Pol'y & L. at 300. See generally The Effectiveness of International Environmental Agreements
(Peter H. Sand ed., 1992) (reprinting background research papers surveying effectiveness of
existing international legal mechanisms developed as part of UNCED preparatory process);
2-3 Robinson, supra note 11, at 1061-1614.
145. See supra note 60.
146. See supra note 61.
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progress on such issues as the initiation of enforcement measures by
nonstate actors and the adoption of nonconsensus decision-making ap-
proaches.
A transition toward expanded participation in multilateral intergov-
ernmental processes by individuals and nongovernmental organizations-
including scientists, industry representatives, and environmentalists-
might create some short-term disarray. In the long run, however, there are
likely to be net gains in the accountability, legitimacy, authority, and even
efficiency of international decision-making processes. Ultimately, there
may be few alternatives to extending procedural rights to nonstate actors.
For example, sustained criticism of the sort leveled at the GATT panel
process in the tuna dolphin controversy 147 over time threatens to under-
mine international confidence in, and perceptions of the integrity of,
multilateral dispute settlement procedures in trade agreements.
Indeed, significant progress in closing the "democracy gap" can be
purchased quite cheaply through reasonably simple, forward-looking
changes on the international level. It is very difficult to quarrel with the
proposition that international environmental obligations ought to be
strictly observed. There is, or ought to be, considerable apprehension by
states such as the United States that have a firm commitment to fulfilling
international obligations concerning compliance by treaty partners, partic-
ularly when there is a potential for competitive disadvantage. Allowing the
public to participate in monitoring the implementation of existing or future
international agreements like those adopted at UNCED would further the
national interest in full global compliance while simultaneously advancing
the cause of environmental quality. Moreover, the desirability of access by
the public to fora in which international law is made, implemented, and
adjudicated and the need for certain nonconsensus decision-making pro-
cedures are well illustrated by, but by no means confined to, the environ-
mental field.
Environment is already at the cutting edge of international legal
developments. Environment may very well be a paradigm that prefigures
the development of the larger body of international law well into the
twenty-first century. In any event, the anticipated follow-up to the Earth
Summit presents major opportunities for progress in this previously
neglected area.
147. See, e.g., 138 Cong. Rec. H7706 (daily ed. Aug. 6, 1992) (statement of Rep. Long that
"many of us are concerned that... the GATF will grant immense power to international trade
panels who will meet in secret to settle disputes and oversee enforcement provisions"); id. at
H7704 (statement of Rep. Sikorski characterizing GATT dispute settlement process as "highly
secretive"); The Role of Science in Adjudicating Trade Disputes Under the North American
Free Trade Agreement: Hearing Before the House Comm. on Science, Space, and Technol-
ogy, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 89 (1992) (statement of Rep. Bacchus characterizing GATT dispute
settlement process as "flawed").
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